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NONSENSE AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH: 
WHAT MEANING MEANS FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
Joseph Blocher* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A great deal of everyday expression is, strictly speaking, nonsense. But 
courts and scholars have done little to consider whether or why such 
meaningless speech, like nonrepresentational art, falls within “the freedom 
of speech.” If, as many suggest, meaning is what separates speech from 
sound and expression from conduct, then the constitutional case for 
nonsense is complicated. And because nonsense is so common, the case is 
also important—artists like Lewis Carroll and Jackson Pollock are not the 
only putative “speakers” who should be concerned about the outcome. 
This Article is the first to explore thoroughly the relationship between 
nonsense and the freedom of speech; in doing so, it suggests ways to 
determine what “meaning” means for First Amendment purposes. The 
Article begins by demonstrating the scope and constitutional salience of 
meaningless speech, showing that nonsense is multifarious, widespread, and 
sometimes intertwined with traditional First Amendment values like 
autonomy, the marketplace of ideas, and democracy. The second part of the 
Article argues that exploring nonsense can illuminate the meaning of 
meaning itself. This, too, is an important task, for although free speech 
discourse often relies on the concept of meaning to chart the Amendment’s 
scope, courts and scholars have done relatively little to establish what it 
entails. Analytic philosophers, meanwhile, have spent the past century 
doing little else. Their efforts—echoes of which can already be heard in 
First Amendment doctrine—suggest that free speech doctrine is best served 
by finding meaning in the way words are used, rather than in their 
relationship to extra-linguistic concepts.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose approach to meaning and language 
changed the course of modern philosophy,1 once wrote: “Don’t, for heavens 
sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your 
nonsense.”2 His exhortation is especially salient for those interested in the 
scope of the First Amendment, because courts and scholars have often 
suggested that the Amendment’s terrain is defined by meaning,3 without 
doing much to show what meaning (or its absence, nonsense) actually 
means. As a result, the concept of meaning operates like a rogue boundary 
surveyor, erratically charting the First Amendment’s territory without 
judicial or scholarly accountability.  
This raises a variety of interesting and difficult questions. If meaning 
establishes the boundaries of the First Amendment, then what are we to 
make of nonsense—“words or language having no meaning or conveying 
no intelligible ideas”4? If the Supreme Court is right that the Amendment’s 
“constitutional safeguard . . . ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people,’”5 then speech lacking such ideas—assuming that it 
                                                
1 See Dennis M. Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law As Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 937, 938 (1990) (hereinafter Law’s Pragmatism) (“It is the thought of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein which is central to modern philosophy’s turn to language. For Wittgenstein, 
all philosophical problems are ultimately problems of language.”). 
2 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 56 (1980); see also WITTGENSTEIN 
AND HIS INTERPRETERS 32 n.22 (Guy Kahan et al. eds., 2007) (“Saul Liberman . . . 
reportedly once introduced a 1940s lecture by the famous Kabbalah scholar Gershom 
Scholem with the words ‘Nonsense is nonsense—but the history of nonsense is 
scholarship.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
3 See, e.g., John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (2008) 
(“Frequently, behavior is said to be covered by the First Amendment if it conveys ‘ideas’ 
or ‘information.’”); Melville Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the First 
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 61 (1973) [hereinafter Nimmer, Symbolic Speech] 
(“The crucial question under the first amendment is simply whether meaningful symbols of 
any type are being employed by one who wishes to communicate to others.”); Peter Meijes 
Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of “Speech”, 1993 WISC. L. REV. 
1525, 1559 (“[T]he first requirement for communication by conduct is that the conduct be 
meaningful, most often as a matter of convention. This is simply an extension of a basic 
principle of language: a speaker normally cannot use sounds to communicate unless the 
sounds have some meaning attached to them.”). 
4 Nonsense Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/nonsense (last visited July 4, 2012). See also William Charlton, 
Nonsense, 17(4) BRITISH J. OF AESTHETICS 346, 346 (1977) (“The notion of nonsense has 
been freely used by philosophers of this century, but no full or satisfactory account has 
been given of it. … The English word ‘nonsense’ seems to apply most appropriately to 
something which purports to have a sense of meaning, but does not in fact have one.”) 
5 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing Roth v. United States, 
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is actually “speech”6—would not seem to merit constitutional coverage at 
all.7 That would be a jarring conclusion indeed, which might explain why 
even those who treat meaning as an essential ingredient of speech tend to 
avoid or assume it away. This is perhaps most noticeable in the context of 
nonrepresentational art such as Jackson Pollock’s drip paintings and Lewis 
Carroll’s nonsense verse. The Supreme Court has reassuringly declared 
these to be “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment.8 But far 
from being unquestionable, their shielding in fact raises questions that are, 
as Mark Tushnet generously puts it, “quite difficult to answer 
satisfactorily.”9  
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the difficulty of these questions is 
not the only cause for concern, and that artists—though they seem to have a 
special relationship with nonsense10—are not the only would-be speakers 
who should be keenly interested in the answer. A large portion of everyday 
                                                                                                                       
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (emphasis added); see also Mosley v. Police Dep’t, 408 U.S. 92, 
95–96 (1972) (“[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from 
government censorship.” (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270) (citations omitted)).  
6 Frederick Schauer, Categories and The First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 
VAND. L. REV. 265, 273 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories] (“[T]he constitutional 
definition of the word ‘speech’ carves out a category that is not coextensive with the 
ordinary language meaning of the word ‘speech.’”). I revisit this assumption below at notes 
264-272 and accompanying text. 
7 My goal is to investigate whether nonsense falls within the First Amendment—a 
question of coverage—not to establish the level of protection it should receive. Frederick 
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004) (“[Q]uestions about the 
involvement of the First Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential 
than are the issues surrounding the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords 
the speech to which it applies.”). 
8 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 
569 (1995) (“As some of these examples show, a narrow, succinctly articulable message is 
not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 
‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of 
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
9 Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 170 
(2012). 
10 Id. at 169 (providing examples of artists denying the necessity of traditional 
meaning in their work, including Archibald MacLeish’s claim that “[a] poem should not 
mean but be,” “Ars Poetica” (1926), and William Carlos Williams’s refrain, “No ideas but 
in things,” “A Sort of a Song”, in The Wedge (1944)). See also Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-
Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1364 (1990) (stating that 
post-modern art “not only rejected the Modernist demand that art be ‘serious,’ it rejected 
the idea that art must have any traditional ‘value’ at all.”); id. at 1367 (“[T]he 80’s has been 
the decade in which art that denies the value of art has become the most valuable art 
around.” (quoting Elizabeth Frank, Art’s Off-the-Wall Critic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, § 
6 (Magazine), at 78)). 
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speech is, strictly speaking, nonsense.11 Sometimes we speak without 
intending to “mean” anything at all—exclamations, jokes, doggerel verse, 
and even philosophical illustrations may all be nonsensical.12 As 
Wittgenstein himself wrote in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “My 
propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally 
recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on 
them, over them.”13 Other times, we are unaware of our own nonsense, 
either because we wrongly believe our propositions to be meaningful or 
because we are simply misunderstood.14 If meaning is a prerequisite for 
constitutional coverage, and much of what we say is meaningless without 
our ever knowing it, then the boundaries of the First Amendment are not 
only narrow but unknown.  
Simply to describe the broad scope of nonsense both demonstrates its 
importance and suggests that meaning is at best an unreliable guide to the 
First Amendment’s hinterlands.15 Moreover, its guidance would not 
necessarily be welcome even if it were accurate, because much nonsensical 
speech rests solidly on the normative foundations of the First 
Amendment—the values that doctrine is created to protect.16 Primary 
                                                
11 See generally Section I.A. 
12 See infra Section I.A.1. (discussing covert nonsense). See also Charlton, supra note 
4, at 346 (“It would normally be thought fairly damning to say of an utterance or a piece of 
writing ‘That is nonsense.’ Yet men of undoubted intelligence, like Edward Lear and Lewis 
Carroll, have devoted time and pains to writing what they admit is nonsense, and talking 
nonsense has been regarded as a conversational art.”). 
13 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 6.54 (C.K. Ogden 
trans) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS]. Whether this is really what he intended 
(and whether he succeeded) is of course another matter. The “meaning” of the Tractatus’ 
avowed lack of sense has been an elusive and perhaps ephemeral grail for analytic 
philosophers. See generally infra notes 93-108 (describing debate over “ineffable” and 
“resolute” readings); see also Leo K.C. Cheung, The Disenchantments of Nonsense: 
Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 31(3) PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 197, 201–
03 (July 2008). 
14 See infra Section I.A.2. (discussing covert nonsense). 
15 I follow Robert Post’s lead by attempting to tell a story in which doctrine and 
normative commitments are mutually interdependent. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, 
EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2012) [hereinafter POST, DEMOCRACY] (“To 
determine the purposes of the First Amendment, therefore, we must consult the actual 
shape of entrenched First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Robert Post, Participatory 
Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 618 (2011)  
(“Because law typically acquires authority from the commitments and principles of those 
whom it seeks to govern, I have sought to identify this fundamental purpose by inquiring 
into our historical commitments and principles.”) (citing Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, 
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the 
Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1474 (2007)). 
16 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: 
Determining What “The Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1676 
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among these are the marketplace of ideas, individual autonomy, and 
democratic participation. Nonsense can and often does further each of 
them.17 
Part I thus sketches the terrain of nonsensical speech, and makes a 
preliminary case for its protection. In doing so, it uncovers a uniquely 
convenient entrance to the very depths of the First Amendment, shining 
light on the idea of meaning itself. Spelunking in this area is difficult and 
hazardous business, and Part II proceeds with caution. But the exploration is 
increasingly unavoidable, for First Amendment theory and doctrine often 
suggest that meaning is an essential part of constitutionally salient speech 
without defining what meaning is or where it comes from. In other words, 
courts and free speech scholars have not explained what meaning means. 
Analytic philosophers, meanwhile, have been doing little else.18 
Throughout the past century (paralleling almost exactly the lifespan of the 
modern First Amendment)19 they have developed two primary methods for 
charting the boundaries of what can meaningfully be said. Of course, their 
goal in doing so has been to find the limits of language, thought, and the 
world,20 not to generate constitutional doctrine. And yet the tools they have 
created—which with egregious but necessary oversimplification can be 
called conceptual meaning and use meaning—have been wielded, 
sometimes awkwardly and perhaps unknowingly, by the Justices 
themselves.  
The “conceptual” approach finds meaning in the relationship between 
expression and underlying concepts.21 Some version of this basic idea 
                                                                                                                       
(2011) (“The answer to the question of what constitutes the freedom of speech depends on 
the conception one adopts, and one’s choice of conception is more analogous to a purely 
subjective preference than to a conclusion reached by a series of falsifiable steps.”). 
17 Infra Section I.B. See also Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to 
Freedom of Speech, 671 UCLA L. REV. 671, 722 (1983) (“Expression that is not intended 
to communicate anything may clearly promote the four values identified by Emerson as 
underlying the first amendment.”). Emerson’s fourth value focuses on “whether, although 
the conduct may not in itself qualify for protection, such protection is necessary to 
safeguard other, qualified conduct.” Id. at 722. I discuss this argument below at notes 154-
159 and accompanying text. 
18 See B.R. Tilghman, Literature, Philosophy, and Nonsense, 30(3) BRITISH J. OF 
AESTHETICS 256, 256 (July 1990) (“[A] good case can be made that the notion of meaning 
and all it implies for the distinction between sense and nonsense has been the primary 
concern of twentieth-century philosophy, at least Anglo-American philosophy.”). 
19 Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
1256, 1278 n.97 (2005) (suggesting that the popular, albeit “crude,” view is that “the First 
Amendment started in 1919” when Justice Holmes wrote his dissent in Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)). 
20 WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 5.6 (“The limits of my language mean 
the limits of my world.”).  
21 See infra II.A. The label itself is a necessary but regrettable simplification. See infra 
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underlies the logical-positivist approach associated with Bertrand Russell 
and the early Wittgenstein, among many others. As Russell once put it, 
“[a]bsorption in language sometimes leads to a neglect of the connexion of 
language with non-linguistic facts, although it is this connexion that gives 
meaning to words and significance to sentences.”22 Under the conceptual 
approach, speech that fails to represent extra-linguistic ideas is simply 
nonsense and, if meaning is an essential ingredient of constitutionally 
salient speech, therefore falls outside the realm of the First Amendment. 
A conceptual approach to meaning apparently animates many of the 
Supreme Court’s efforts to chart the boundaries of the freedom of speech, 
from the oft-repeated aphorism that “[t]he First Amendment . . . embodies 
our profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas”23 to the 
Spence test, which asks whether “an intent to convey a particularized 
message was present, and whether the likelihood was great that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.”24 The conceptual approach is 
also implicitly employed by those who fret about the constitutional 
protection of nonrepresentational art.25 Nonrepresentationalism, after all, is 
only problematic for the First Amendment if representativeness itself is 
constitutionally relevant.  
Despite its intuitive appeal, the conceptual approach is defective as a 
constitutional principle. Requiring speech acts to represent ideas would 
exclude nearly all of the potentially valuable nonsense described in Part I. 
Indeed, the conceptual approach would effectively deny constitutional 
coverage to vast stretches of discourse, including ethics, aesthetics, and 
religion, all of which—according to the conceptualist philosophers—lie 
beyond language’s power to represent. On the conceptual account, they 
simply “cannot be expressed,”26 and thus “the tendency of all men who ever 
tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of 
language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely 
hopeless.”27 Fortunately, the First Amendment is not so limited; the 
                                                                                                                       
note 164. 
22 HERBERT HOCHBERG, INTRODUCING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, Preface (2003). 
23 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal citation omitted). See also 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (“All ideas having even the slightest 
redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to 
the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the [First Amendment’s] 
guarantees.”) (internal citation omitted). 
24 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
25 See, e.g., Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 35 (“It would be shocking to 
conclude that symphonic compositions or nonrepresentational art could be the subject of 
governmental censorship. Both are fully within the ambit of the first amendment 
notwithstanding their lack of both verbal and cognitive content.”). 
26 WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 6.421. 
27 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE WITTGENSTEIN READER 296 (Anthony Kenny ed., 
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boundaries of the freedom of speech are not coextensive with the “walls of 
our cage.”  
In part to escape that cage, analytic philosophy long ago took what is 
known as the linguistic turn.28 That development, which is closely 
associated with Wittgenstein’s later work, speech act theory, and ordinary 
language philosophy, generally holds that “[t]he bounds of sense, as it were, 
are all within language, and meaning is nowhere other than in the many 
activities in which human beings use their various languages.”29 As 
Wittgenstein explained, “[f]or a large class of cases—though not for all—in 
which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of 
a word is its use in the language.”30 Finding the boundaries of meaning, 
then, depends on identifying the “language games” that “consist[] of 
language and the actions into which it is woven.”31 
Echoes of a use meaning approach can already be found in First 
Amendment discourse and doctrine. It explains the Court’s conclusion that 
constitutional coverage extends to practices that form a “significant medium 
for the communication of ideas,”32 and is not “confined to expressions 
conveying a ‘particularized message.’”33 One can also find the influence of 
such an approach in First Amendment scholarship, perhaps most 
prominently and thoughtfully in Robert Post’s argument that First 
Amendment values “do not attach to abstract acts of communication as 
such, but rather to the social contexts that envelop and give constitutional 
                                                                                                                       
1994) (quoted in James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, 
Postmodernism, and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 519 (1999)). 
28 Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 
1854–55 (1994) (“The legacy of philosophy from the middle of this century to the present 
has been the systematic replacement of foundationalist epistemology with holism, the 
substitution of referential theories of language with an emphasis on speech as action, and a 
general movement away from the individual as the foundation of empirical, linguistic, and 
moral judgment.”). 
29 Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270, 303–04 
(1993) (internal citation omitted); see also Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 177, 177 (1985) (“Conventionalism is a viewpoint, most closely associated with the 
later writings of Wittgenstein, that emphasizes practice and context. It holds, for example, 
that we understand a concept not when we grasp some fact, but when we can successfully 
use that concept within a language game or a defined context, and that truth is a function of 
the agreement of those participating within a practice rather than the other way around.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
30 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 43 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed 1958) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS]. 
31 Id. at 7. 
32 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
33 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995) (internal citations omitted).   
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significance to acts of communication.”34 
The use meaning approach improves on the conceptual approach both 
descriptively and normatively. It accounts for the constitutional value in 
various forms of nonsense, captures the contextual and socially embedded 
nature of language, and provides better answers to thorny problems like the 
constitutional status of art. Under the use meaning approach, 
“Jabberwocky” is protected by the First Amendment not because its words 
represent concepts, but because it is recognizable as a poem. By contrast, 
those acts and utterances that violate the rules of our “language games” 
simply do not count as meaningful speech, even if they represent facts or 
concepts and would therefore be meaningful under the conceptual 
approach.35 
The Article thus concludes by endorsing the First Amendment’s 
linguistic turn and its effort to find meaning in use, rather than in the 
relationship of language to concepts. Making the most of such an approach, 
however, is no simple task.36 As Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson put it, 
language games “refuse clear-cut boundaries, they borrow and steal from 
other sources, they overlap with other language games, and their governing 
rules are always in a state of flux and disputation. Lived language games are 
unruly and unkempt, untamed and untidy, much as life itself is.”37 But if the 
First Amendment’s boundaries depend on them, then such games must be 
tamed. Doctrine must provide guidance; it must be able to identify the First 
Amendment language games that create the kind of meaning the 
constitution requires. The use meaning approach does not provide easy 
answers to these problems, but it does provide a better set of questions with 
which to address them. 
 
I.  STUFF AND NONSENSE 
 
Making sense of nonsense for First Amendment purposes involves at 
                                                
34 Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255 
(1995) [hereinafter Post, Recuperating]; see also id. at 1276–77 (“Instead of aspiring to 
articulate abstract characteristics of speech, doctrine out to identify discrete forms of social 
order that are imbued with constitutional value, and it ought to clarify and safeguard the 
ways in which speech facilitates that constitutional value.”). My goal here is, in part, to 
show that one potential “abstract characteristic[] of speech”—meaning—is in fact derived 
from “discrete forms of social order.” 
35 Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 771-75 
(2001) (considering the First Amendment claims of a person who protests speed limits by 
violating them).  
36 See infra Section III.C. 
37 Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 
1802 (1994) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Grammar]; see also WITTGENSTEIN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 65. 
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least two tasks: establishing what nonsense is, and determining whether it 
has constitutional value.38 This Part attempts to accomplish both, first 
sketching the landscape of meaningless speech and then showing how that 
nonsense relates to the basic values traditionally associated with the First 
Amendment. The discussion therefore not only describes the scope and 
value of nonsense, but also delivers a preliminary case for its constitutional 
protection and opens the door for Part II’s exploration of the concept of 
meaning itself. 
Because the goal is to have constitutional reasoning drive conceptual 
analysis rather than the other way around, the discussion here evaluates the 
scope and constitutional value of nonsense in somewhat general terms—as 
the absence of meaning39—before elaborating a more rigorous definition of 
meaning in Part II. The downside of this approach is that it is, as an initial 
matter, over-expansive: Jackson Pollock’s work, for example, lacks a 
certain kind of meaning (propositional content), and therefore qualifies as a 
certain kind of nonsense, despite its undoubted value and First Amendment 
protection. Indeed, that is precisely the point of the following discussion—
to develop an appropriate definition of meaning based on an understanding 
of what it would exclude. And at least as an initial matter, it is not enough 
to simply posit that meaning is not to be equated with propositional content, 
for much First Amendment scholarship and doctrine makes precisely that 
connection.40  
Section I.A begins by describing nonsense’s broad domain. 
Traditionally, it has been thought that boundary disputes between meaning 
and nonsense are only really relevant to the First Amendment in the context 
of art, and that a capacious view of that category can more or less solve the 
problem. But nonsense contains multitudes, and not all of its forms are 
easily recognizable as such. The very scope of nonsense demonstrates the 
importance of explaining it, and also suggests that unless the First 
Amendment has been radically misunderstood, the constitution covers at 
least some of this meaningless speech. 
As a matter of doctrine, however, it is not particularly satisfying to say 
that nonsense must be protected by the constitution because there is so 
much of it. In order to merit coverage, nonsense must presumably further 
the values traditionally associated with the First Amendment,41 such as 
                                                
38 One might also ask whether nonsense can be “speech,” but I will assume an 
affirmative answer for now and return to that issue below. See infra 268-272 and 
accompanying text. 
39 See supra note 4 and sources cited therein. 
40 See infra notes 160-162 and 195-206 and accompanying text. 
41 POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, at 4 (“The actual contours of First Amendment 
doctrine cannot be explained merely by facts in the world; they must instead reflect the 
law’s efforts to achieve constitutional values.”). 
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autonomy, the marketplace of ideas, and democracy. Section I.B argues that 
nonsense does exactly that, advancing the autonomous search for unsayable 
truths, contributing to cognitive advancement despite lacking “meaning” of 
its own, and even providing valuable outlets for political dissent. It follows 
that the First Amendment must make room for nonsense, as Part II argues in 
more detail. 
 
A.  The Scope of Nonsense 
 
Whatever else it suggests, Wittgenstein’s admonition to “pay attention 
to your nonsense” was at the very least a call to recognize nonsense where it 
arises. As this Section shows, that is a difficult but rewarding task, for 
nonsense takes many forms.42 In an effort to impose some order, the 
following discussion divides nonsense—“[w]ords or signs having no 
intelligible meaning”43—into two major categories: overt and covert.44 
 
1. Overt Nonsense 
 
At almost the same time as Russell and Wittgenstein were busy in 
Cambridge trying to pin down nonsense, Lewis Carroll was busy in Oxford 
releasing more of it. “Jabberwocky,” perhaps his most famous piece of 
nonsense verse (and a cameo performer in First Amendment doctrine),45 
                                                
42 Charlton, supra note 4, at 346 (“In general philosophers have gone wrong in 
supposing that whatever is nonsensical is nonsensical in the same way.”). 
43 “Nonsense,” The Free Dictionary, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/nonsense (last 
visited July 11, 2012); see also “Nonsense,” The Oxford Dictionary, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/nonsense (last visited July 11, 2012) 
(“spoken or written words that have no meaning or make no sense”). 
44 It would be perfectly plausible to slice nonsense in other ways, however—between 
purposeful and accidental, substantial and mere, illuminating and misleading, and so on. 
Oskari Kuusela, Nonsense and Clarification in the Tractatus—Resolute and Ineffability 
Readings and the Tractatus’ Failure, in WITTGENSTEIN AND THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY: 
ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA, 35, 37 (Sami Pihlström ed., 2006), available at 
http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/conant/Readings%20of% 
20TLP%20and%20its%20failure[1].pdf (distinguishing “between misleading and 
illuminating nonsense. The former is unself-conscious nonsense attempting to say what can 
only be shown. The latter is self-conscious nonsense intended to reveal its own 
nonsensicalness.”).  
The two approaches to meaning discussed in Part II also suggest their own definitions 
of nonsense; indeed, the Article concludes by arguing that “conceptual” nonsense is 
constitutionally protected, while “use” nonsense is not. Because that argument is dependent 
in part on the fact that the former would include—and therefore exclude from constitutional 
coverage—so much everyday nonsense, it is better to start with a more general definition 
of nonsense. 
45 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
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begins: “’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the 
wabe; / All mimsy were the borogroves, / and the mome raths outgrabe.”46 
As far as the reader can tell,47 these are symbols with no references; “sound 
and fury, signifying nothing.”48 As such, they are overt nonsense.49 
Neither the speaker nor the hearer of overt nonsense believes it to have 
meaning. Its lack of meaning is thus both intentional and apparent.50  Some 
overt nonsense is fanciful, in that it does not purport to convey meaning, but 
rather is designed to create a sense of amusement or delight in the listener. 
People seem to enjoy such nonsense for the same reasons that babies gurgle 
at novel stimuli—it provides a sense of wonder, possibility, and absurdity. 
But overt nonsense need not have such an ulterior purpose; it can simply be 
nonsense for nonsense’s sake.51  
Much artistic expression is overtly and sometimes avowedly 
nonsensical. In his thoughtful analysis of nonrepresentational art, Mark 
Tushnet points out that many artists—from Archibald MacLeish to William 
Carlos Williams—have denied the need for, or desirability of, a direct 
connection between art and traditional meaning.52 As Williams put it, “A 
poem should not mean but be.”53 In a recent essay, Charles Rosen makes a 
similar point:  
We should recall here the extraordinary sixteenth-century 
                                                                                                                       
557, 569 (1995). The Jabberwocky is perhaps the most famous of Carroll’s nonsense, but it 
is by no means the only example. See, e.g., LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 
(1865) (“Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might appear to others 
that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than what you would have 
appeared to be otherwise.”). 
46 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 
12 (1872). 
47 Carroll and Humpty Dumpty—his avatar of nonsense—later provided a glossary of 
terms, but the poem itself nonetheless operates like a nonsensical “private language.” See 
infra 234-235 and accompanying text (discussing Humpty Dumpty’s private language). 
48 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 5, sc. 5. 
49 See Kuusela, supra note 44, at 37 (describing Peter Hacker’s view of overt 
nonsense). Cf. P.M.S. HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
WITTGENSTEIN 18–19 (1987) [hereinafter HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION](distinguishing 
overt and covert nonsense). 
50 Charlton refers to something like this when he discusses “factual” nonsense: “An 
utterance is factual nonsense if a person uttering it cannot mean what he says without 
ignoring plain facts, or what are taken to be plain facts.” Charlton, supra note 4, at 352 
(distinguishing factual from “grammatical” and “logical” nonsense). 
51 Id. at 355 (“A man could not, of course, compose what he knows is nonsense 
without having a purpose of some sort. But he need have no ulterior purpose, no reason for 
writing what he writes except that it is nonsense. Lear and Carroll, at least, seem to have 
written nonsense for its own sake in this way.”). 
52 Tushnet, supra note 9, at 169. 
53 Id. (quoting William Carlos Williams, “A Sort of a Song,” in THE WEDGE (1944)). 
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controversy about style between the admirers of Cicero and 
Erasmus, the former, led by Etienne Dolet, believing that 
style had a beauty independent of the matter of the literary 
work, and the latter insisting that the beauty of style was 
wholly dependent on its consonance of meaning.54 
Of course, one need not look that far (nor that high) to find examples of art 
that overtly lacks conceptual meaning. Consider the lyrics of popular songs, 
from “I Am the Walrus”55 to “Who Put the Bomp”56 to those consisting 
entirely of gibberish.57 
The relationship between overt nonsense and art is not monogamous, 
however. Philosophers and linguists frequently rely on overt nonsense as an 
analytic instrument.58 The Tractatus, for example, openly proclaims itself to 
lack meaning.59 A.W. Moore and Peter Sullivan explain that Wittgenstein 
had no choice but to use nonsense to demonstrate the boundaries of 
meaning itself: “The Tractatus consists mostly of nonsense because what 
Wittgenstein is trying to convey, about language and its limits, is, by its 
own lights, ineffable. The only way in which he can convey it—the only 
                                                
54 Charles Rosen, Freedom and Art, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (May 10, 
2012), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/may/10/freedom-and-
art. 
55 THE BEATLES, I Am the Walrus, on MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR (Capitol Records 
1967) (“Semolina pilchards climbing up the Eiffel Tower / Elementary penguin singing 
Hare Krishna / man you should have seen them / kicking Edgar Allen Poe”); see also THE 
BEATLES, Come Together, on ABBEY ROAD  Capitol Records 1969).  
56 BARRY MILLS, WHO PUT THE BOMP (ABC-Paramount 1961) (“When my baby heard 
/ ‘Bomp bah bah bomp’ / ‘Bah bomp bah bomp bah bomp bomp’ / Every word went right 
into her heart.”) 
57 ADRIANO CELENTANO, Prisencolinensinainciusol, on NOSTALROCK (Clan Celentano 
1973) (consisting of “lyrics” that mimic what American English sounds like to an Italian-
speaking listener). 
58 Cf. Charlton, supra note 4, at 347 (“Unless they wish to illustrate a philosophic point 
people seldom compose total nonsense on purpose.”). 
59 WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 6.54 (“My propositions are 
elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless . . . 
.”). Wittgenstein’s use of the word “senseless” rather than “nonsense” is significant, for he 
posited a difference between the two. For the purposes of the present discussion, however, 
those weeds can hopefully be avoided, for both involve a lack of meaning. LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2.2 (2010), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/Wittgenstein/ [hereinafter STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA] 
(“The characteristic of being senseless applies not only to the propositions of logic but also 
to other things that cannot be represented, such as mathematics or the pictorial form itself 
of the pictures that do represent. These are, like tautologies and contradictions, literally 
sense-less, they have no sense. Beyond, or aside from, senseless propositions Wittgenstein 
identifies another group of statements which cannot carry sense: the nonsensical (unsinnig) 
propositions. Nonsense, as opposed to senselessness, is encountered when a proposition is 
even more radically devoid of meaning, when it transcends the bounds of sense.”). 
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way in which he can get the reader to ‘see the world aright’—is by dint of a 
special kind of nonsense: what we might call ‘illuminating’ nonsense.”60 
Unsurprisingly, many linguists have taken a similar approach. In his 
dissertation, for example, Noam Chomsky set out to demonstrate among 
other things that a sentence can be grammatically correct and yet lack 
semantic meaning. His famous example was the phrase “[c]olorless green 
ideas sleep furiously.”61  
 
2. Covert Nonsense 
 
Whereas the meaninglessness of overt nonsense is self-conscious62 and 
apparent to speaker and hearer alike, covert nonsense is potentially more 
insidious. It arises where a speaker or hearer (or both) incorrectly believes 
that they are successfully exchanging meaningful ideas.  
Perhaps the most common type of covert nonsense is the 
straightforward misunderstanding, in which speaker and hearer disagree 
about the specific meaning of a particular speech act, or even whether the 
purported speech act has meaning at all. This Section cannot and will not 
attempt to fully address the relationship between misunderstandings and the 
freedom of speech—an interesting issue in its own right—but rather tries to 
identify the particular problems that misunderstandings pose for meaning-
dependent approaches to the First Amendment. 
“Simple” misunderstandings occur when the speaker intends one 
meaning and the listener hears another. Such situations are, of course, 
extremely common, but—taken at face value—some approaches to the 
definition of speech might exclude them.63 Carroll’s poetry and Pollock’s 
                                                
60 A.W. Moore & Peter Sullivan, Ineffability and Nonsense, 77 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUPP. VOL. 169, 179 (2003). As Wittgenstein explained, the aim 
of the Tractatus was to “draw a limit to thinking,” which “can . . . only be drawn in 
language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.” 
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, at Preface. 
61 NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 15 (1957). 
62 Kuusela, supra note 44, at 37. 
63 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (the Court “cannot 
accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ 
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea”); 
Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 37 (concluding that “symbolic speech requires 
not merely that given conduct results in a meaning effect, but that the actor causing such 
conduct must intend such a meaning effect by his conduct”).  
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that these authorities would actually exclude 
misunderstandings from the First Amendment, only that their approaches seem to do so, as 
stated. Nimmer, for example, posited that a “meaning effect” was necessary for symbolic 
speech, but also that the Amendment covered speech lacking “both verbal and cognitive 
content.” Id. 
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paintings are “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment,64 but one 
might reasonably ask whether many people “understand” them. For that 
matter, one could ask the same of Finnegan’s Wake, Matthew Barney’s 
movies, or any number of other impenetrable artistic works. So, too, are few 
listeners able to understand the specific meanings of most scientific, 
scholarly, or even legal speech. And it would be troubling, to say the least, 
if discussions of ERISA or the Higgs Boson—or professors’ efforts to teach 
them—lack First Amendment protection simply because so few people 
comprehend them at first. 
But misunderstandings can be more complicated. In addition to 
disagreeing about what meaning is conveyed by a purported speech act, 
people sometimes disagree about whether the act is meaningful at all. Such 
“deep” misunderstandings arise in at least two ways, which can with some 
oversimplification be called “lost meaning” and “found meaning.” The 
former occurs where a speaker intends to convey meaning and the listener 
fails to recognize not only the specific meaning, but the nature of the act as 
meaningful. In other words, the listener does not even perceive the 
purported speech act as an effort to communicate meaning. Consider a 
computer programmer who expresses herself in code.65 A non-programmer 
might not only fail understand the code’s specific meaning, but that it 
contains meaning at all.  
Found meaning, by contrast, arises where a listener imputes meaning to 
an act when the putative speaker never meant to convey any. First 
Amendment theory and doctrine have not focused extensively on the 
possibility of found meaning, but interesting hypotheticals easily come to 
mind. Imagine, for example, that a person sees a famous pianist sitting on a 
bench at her piano. The performer is simply taking a break, thinking about a 
recent vacation. The starstruck and credulous viewer, however, imagines 
that she is trying out a new performance of John Cage’s 4’33”, which 
consists of four and a half minutes of silence.66 The viewer has discovered 
meaning and imputed it to the daydreaming pianist, but no volitional speech 
has occurred. One could even stipulate that the person on the bench is not a 
pianist at all, but a janitor resting after her shift. Or imagine a traveler 
strolling in a foreign country, singing the supposedly nonsensical words of 
his favorite song. Little does he know that in the country he is visiting, 
                                                
64 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995). 
65 See Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Communication does not lose constitutional protection as ‘speech’ simply because it is 
expressed in the language of computer code. Mathematical formulae and musical scores are 
written in ‘code,’ i.e., symbolic notations not comprehensible to the uninitiated, and yet 
both are covered by the First Amendment.”). 
66 JOHN CAGE, 4’33” (1952). 
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“semolina pilchards” is a grievous and actionable insult. Is the janitor or the 
tourist “speaking” for First Amendment purposes, notwithstanding the fact 
that neither intends to communicate any meaning? 
First Amendment theory and doctrine do not provide clear answers as to 
whether such unintentional speech is constitutionally covered.67 On the one 
hand, denying constitutional coverage to unintended speech could leave out 
a wide range of speakers who cannot control their speech acts—those who 
are under coercion or asleep, for example. A person with Tourette 
Syndrome may have involuntary verbal tics that can include a wide variety 
of “vocalizations,” from “grunting, throat clearing, shouting and barking” to 
“socially inappropriate words and phrases.”68 If such a person were to 
involuntarily utter an actionable threat or libel, shouldn’t she be able to raise 
the First Amendment as a defense? On the one hand, Tushnet suggests that 
a “‘reasonable’ imputation of meaning to otherwise meaningless words—or 
symbols—is sufficient to trigger First Amendment coverage.”69 On the 
other hand, treating involuntary acts as meaningful speech also suggests that 
the people who “spoke” them can be held responsible for meaning they 
never intended to convey. Transforming their nonsense into speech will not 
always work to their advantage, as the student in Morse v. Frederick 
learned.70 
Finally, covert nonsense can arise where both speaker and hearer 
incorrectly believe that they have communicated meaningful ideas. Even 
though the parties think they are engaged in communication, their words 
actually lack meaning.71 This sounds farfetched, but probably happens more 
often that we would like to think. On some accounts, language is 
meaningful only when it refers to some extra-linguistic fact,72 and a great 
deal of everyday speech fails this test. Normative statements such as “you 
                                                
67 In “Mental States and Constitutional Rights” (work in progress), I consider in some 
detail whether constitutional rights have act and mental state requirements analogous to 
those found in tort and criminal law. 
68 What is Tourette Syndrome?, NAT’L TOURETTE SYNDROME ASS’N, http://www.tsa-
usa.org/aMedical/whatists.html (last visited June 19, 2012). 
69 Tushnet, supra note 9 at 198; see also id. at at 215 (“Taken together with Hurley and 
Cohen, Humanitarian Law Project implies that any activity that enough people regard as 
having some meaning, noncognitive as well as cognitive, must survive the highest level of 
scrutiny . . . .”). 
70 551 U.S. 393, 401–02 (2007) (upholding punishment of student who displayed 
banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” notwithstanding student’s belief that the banner 
was “nonsense meant to attract television cameras”). 
71 Cf. Kuusela, supra note 44, at 37 (distinguishing “between misleading and 
illuminating nonsense. The former is unself-conscious nonsense attempting to say what can 
only be shown. The latter is self-conscious nonsense intended to reveal its own 
nonsensicalness.”). 
72 See infra Section II.A (describing conceptual approach). 
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should X,” for example, are effectively nonsensical under this approach, 
except as corruptions of the statement “I want you to X.” Wittgenstein 
himself believed, at least in his early phase, that aesthetics, ethics, and 
theology “cannot be expressed,”73 and are therefore nonsensical.  But of 
course they are also enormously significant—many people regard such 
matters as the very lifeblood of public discourse.  
The very idea of covert nonsense is somewhat unsettling; its apparent 
scope is downright disturbing. If much of what we say is nonsensical 
without our even realizing it, then the boundaries of the First Amendment 
are not only narrow but unknown. Any time we fail to give meaning to our 
propositions, despite our best efforts and despite believing that we have 
done so, we are operating outside of constitutional protections. 
 
B.  The Constitutional Value of Nonsense 
 
Simply describing the broad scope of nonsense suggests that the 
meaning-dependent approach provides a poor map of the First 
Amendment’s actual boundaries, for much of the nonsensical speech 
discussed in the previous Section is undoubtedly covered by the 
constitution. But it is unsatisfying to say that nonsense should be protected 
by the First Amendment simply because it is plentiful. Appealing as that 
conclusion might be, it is normatively defensible only if nonsense serves 
relevant constitutional values such as the marketplace of ideas, individual 
autonomy, and democracy.74 The following discussion attempts to show 
that nonsense is in fact an important means of furthering each of those 
values. 
 
1. The Marketplace of Ideas 
 
                                                
73 WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, §§ 6.42, .421 (“Hence also there can be 
no ethical propositions. . . . [E]thics cannot be expressed.”). See also WITTGENSTEIN, 
TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 4.003 (“[M]ost propositions and questions, that have been 
written about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless.”), Gregory S. Kavka, 
Wittgensteinian Political Theory, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1455, 1458 n.7 (1974) (“Since . . . 
Wittgenstein holds that propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and religion are not amenable to 
such analysis, he concludes that such propositions lack cognitive significance. . . . This 
does not mean that Wittgenstein regards the propositions of aesthetics, ethics, and religion 
as worthless—such propositions are strictly speaking nonsensical, yet they possess a kind 
of mystical significance for they try to express that which is important but linguistically 
inexpressible.”). 
74 I do not mean to suggest that these are the only free speech principles, nor that we 
must choose only one of them. Post, Recuperating, supra note 34, at 1271 (“There is in fact 
no general free speech principle . . . .”). 
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The marketplace of ideas—the first75 and perhaps still most prominent76 
effort to justify the freedom of speech—rests on the notion that, if left 
unregulated, good ideas will eventually win out over bad ones. In American 
law, the theory is traced to Justice Holmes’ argument that “the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the marketplace.”77 Importantly, the truths that the marketplace can 
supposedly uncover are not narrowly defined, and can include political and 
ethical insights as well as empirical facts.78 As Justice Brandeis put it in his 
own statement of the marketplace rationale, “freedom to think as you will 
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth.”79  
Inasmuch as nonsense represents a disconnect between words and 
ideas,80 it seems out of place in a marketplace devoted to the latter, 
particularly when ideas are valuable only as handmaidens to truth.81 This is 
particularly so under some conceptions of “truth” itself. Just as some 
                                                
75 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2356 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Reconciling]. 
76 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (1960) (arguing that 
establishing truth through a marketplace of ideas “is not merely the ‘best’ test. There is no 
other.”); see also William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First 
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“In Speech Clause jurisprudence, for 
example, the oft-repeated metaphor that the First Amendment fosters a marketplace of 
ideas that allows truth to ultimately prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized.”). 
77 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also 
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 45 
(H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959) (1644) (“Let her and Falsehood grapple; who 
ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”). 
78 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“These test-related distinctions reflect the constitutional importance of maintaining a free 
marketplace of ideas, a marketplace that provides access to ‘social, political, esthetic, 
moral, and other ideas and experiences.’” (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 390 (1969)). 
79 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
80 “Nonsense,” Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/nonsense (last visited July 4, 2012) (defining nonsense as “words or language 
having no meaning or conveying no intelligible ideas”). 
81 See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 205 (“What ‘idea’ does Jackson Pollock’s Blue Poles: 
No.11 convey? Even more, what idea does Ulysses convey?”). Sheldon H. Nahmod, 
Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the First 
Amendment, 1987 WISC. L. REV. 221, 231. (“The [marketplace] theory’s emphasis on 
ideas, however, is troubling, and has the potential for making the first amendment value of 
art derivative. To the extent that the concept of ideas refers to intellectual and cognitive 
processes, it does not take account of the noncognitive and emotional aspects of 
communication which often accompany artistic expression, especially of the 
nonrepresentational kind.”). Cf. Brandt v. Bd. of Educ. Of City of Chicago, 480 F.3d 460, 
465 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Self expression is not to be equated to the expression of ideas or 
opinions and thus to participation in the intellectual marketplace.”).  
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analytic approaches find meaning in the relationship between language and 
extra-linguistic facts,82 the correspondence theory of truth holds that 
statements are true when they represent “actual” extra-linguistic facts.83 As 
Russell explained, “a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is 
false when there is no corresponding fact.”84 A statement that does not 
correspond to a fact therefore seems meaningless under a formal approach 
to meaning, and false under a correspondence theory of truth. If 
meaningless statements do not even refer to extra-linguistic facts, how can 
they possibly promote the intellectual search for those facts? 
But such an argument unfairly oversimplifies both the normative vision 
of the marketplace model and the potential cognitive value of nonsense. As 
to the former, even the harshest critics of the marketplace model do not 
envision it being animated solely by a correspondence theory of truth. 
Under the marketplace approach, the value of free speech extends beyond 
the accurate identification of facts. Instead, the vision seems to be of what is 
called a “coherence” theory of truth, one that identifies as true that which 
people, through open discussion, come to regard as such.85 The First 
Amendment generally shies away from legally enforceable determinations 
about what is “really” true, at least with regard to speech in public 
discourse.86 
Even if one thinks that the First Amendment is concerned only with the 
conveyance of true facts, it is apparent that doctrine embodies a kind of 
epistemological humility on the part of government.87 The reasons for this 
                                                
82 See infra Section II.A. 
83 See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 84 (1912). 
84 Id. at 85. 
85 Paul G. Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
157, 167 (1980) (noting that, under the modern analytic approach, “there is no simple or 
certain way to know the meanings of words and sentences; even their ‘truth’ depends on 
the game in which they are used.”). There is of course a danger of tautology here, one that 
reemerges in efforts to define as “speech” that which people recognize as such. Cf. Post, 
Reconciling, supra note 75, at 2366 (“In the absence of such a morality [of public debate], 
it is merely tautological to presume that truth is what most people come to believe after 
open discussion.”). 
86 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“The First Amendment 
recognizes no such thing as a ‘false’ idea.” (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 339 (1974))). As Post notes, the Court has also said that “there is no constitutional 
value in false statements of fact.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 
15, at 29–31, 43–47 (suggesting that the distinction can be explained based on whether the 
purportedly false statements are part of public discourse). See also United States v. 
Alvarez, --- S.Ct. ---- (June 28, 2012) (striking down Stolen Valor Act, which criminalized 
lies about certain military medals). 
87 Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic 
Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CALIF. L. 
REV. 267, 271 (1991).  
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are easy enough to perceive, and they suggest that nonsense may be entitled 
to protection under a marketplace theory. One such reason is a general 
distrust for government officials determining the meaning of private 
speech.88 And perhaps if the marketplace model requires judges to be 
agnostic as to truthfulness, then they should also be agnostic as to 
meaningfulness.  
Some version of this concern has arisen in the context of art, with many 
judges and scholars arguing that judges are not well-suited to determine 
art’s meaning, value, or even existence. As Justice Holmes once put it, 
judging the value of art is a “dangerous undertaking for persons trained only 
in the law.”89 If we do not trust judges to identify which of many possible 
meanings a work of art conveys, why would we trust them to identify 
whether it conveys meaning at all? After all, imbuing meaning where none 
is intended can distort speech just as much as other forms of 
misunderstanding. Consider again Carroll’s verse. Some believe 
“Jabberwocky” to be overtly nonsensical, as suggested above.90 Others 
suggest to the contrary that the poem represents not nonsense, but a 
                                                
88 Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 
2 (1989) [hereinafter Schauer, Second-Best] (“Not only the first amendment, but also the 
very idea of a principle of freedom of speech, is an embodiment of a risk-averse distrust of 
decisionmakers.”); see generally Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First 
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985). 
89 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); see also Miller 
v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1100 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) 
(“[A First Amendment claim regarding nude dancing] strikes judges as ridiculous in part 
because we are either middle-aged or elderly men, in part because we tend to be snooty 
about popular culture, in part because as public officials we have a natural tendency to 
think political expression more important than artistic expression, in part because we are 
Americans—which means that we have been raised in a culture in which puritanism, 
philistinism, and promiscuity are complexly and often incongruously interwoven—and in 
part because like all lawyers we are formalists who believe deep down that the speech in 
statutes and the Constitution mean what they say, and a striptease is not speech.”), rev’d 
sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
The question has also proven difficult for persons not “trained only in the law,” as 
Jeremy Waldron points out: “What [art critics] find is that they cannot agree about the 
definition of ‘art.’” Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some 
Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REV. 509, 530–31 (1994). 
90 Susan Stuart, Shibboleths and Ceballos: Eroding Constitutional Rights Through 
Pseudocommunication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (“Jabberwocky has no meaning, 
at least that an adult audience could discern.”). The word “Jabberwocky,” after all, is often 
used as a synonym for mere nonsense. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of 
Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1478 (2010) (“The artistic solution, in 
effect, is the expression, or vehicle, for the themes, meaning, and emotion essential to the 
found artistic problem. Without it, artistic expression becomes nothing more than 
Jabberwocky.”). 
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purposeful and illustrative distortion of sense.91 Who are judges to 
determine which of these is the better interpretation of Carroll?  
Nonsense—overt and otherwise—can also be a useful, perhaps even 
essential, tool in illuminating certain kinds of truth.92 Consider again (and 
again and again) the Tractatus. What is the truth value of a book that 
proclaims itself to be nonsensical? That question has bedeviled and divided 
philosophers for the better part of a century,93 and although no clear victor 
has emerged, their efforts demonstrate that nonsense can play a unique and 
important role in the intellectual marketplace.  
The battle lines of the Tractarian debate are currently drawn between 
what have been called the “ineffable” and “resolute” readings. The former, 
represented prominently by Bertrand Russell, Peter Hacker, and others,94 
holds that “there are, according to the author of the Tractatus, ineffable 
truths that can be apprehended.”95 As Russell put it in his introduction to the 
Tractatus, “after all, Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about 
what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the skeptical reader that possibly 
there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some 
other exit.”96 And as Hacker points out, “that there are things that cannot be 
put into words, but which make themselves manifest (Tractatus 6.522) is a 
leitmotif running through the whole of the Tractatus.”97 According to the 
                                                
91 Peter J. Lucas, Jabberwocky back to Old English: Nonsense, Anglo-Saxon and 
Oxford, in LANGUAGE HISTORY AND LINGUISTIC MODELLING 503 (1997). 
92 Kuusela, supra note 44, at 37.  
93 STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 59, § 2.4 (“‘Nonsense’ has become the hinge 
of Wittgensteinian interpretative discussion during the last decade of the 20th century. 
Beyond the bounds of language lies nonsense—propositions which cannot picture 
anything—and Wittgenstein bans traditional metaphysics to that area. The quandary arises 
concerning the question of what it is that inhabits that realm of nonsense since Wittgenstein 
does seem to be saying that there is something there to be shown (rather than said) and 
does, indeed, characterize it as the ‘mystical.’”). 
94 See, e.g., G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, AN INTRODUCTION TO WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 
162 (1971); HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION, supra note 49; ANTHONY KENNY, 
WITTGENSTEIN (2006); NORMAN MALCOLM, NOTHING IS HIDDEN, WITTGENSTEIN’S 
CRITICISM OF HIS EARLY THOUGHT (1986). 
95 Peter M.S. Hacker, Was He Trying to Whistle It?, in THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN 353, 
368 (Alice Marguerite Crary & Rupert J. Read eds., 2000) [hereinafter Hacker, Trying to 
Whistle It]. The reference in Hacker’s title is to a remark by Wittgenstein’s friend, the 
Cambridge mathematician Frank Ramsey, who wrote that if Wittgenstein was right, then 
“we must take seriously that [philosophy] is nonsense, and not pretend, as Wittgenstein 
does, that it is an important nonsense.” FRANK RAMSEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
MATHEMATICS 263 (R.B. Braithwaite ed., 1931). Connecting the famous final line of the 
Tractatus to Wittgenstein’s well-known habit, Ramsey wrote, “[b]ut what we can’t say, we 
can’t say, and we can’t whistle it either.” Id. at 238. 
96 WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, at xxviii (referencing § 7). 
97 Hacker, Trying to Whistle It, supra note 95, at 353; see also Roy Brand, Making 
Sense Speaking Nonsense, 35(3) PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM 311, 323 (2004) (“According to 
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ineffable reading, Wittgenstein’s goal was to help us see these things 
“aright,” and then to discard the apparatus that helped us to do so.98 The 
book itself is overt nonsense (or at least aims to be, for those who 
understand it), but with a purpose.  
The resolute or “austere” reading, most closely associated with James 
Conant and Cora Diamond,99 rejects the notion that there are unsayable 
truths, or different kinds of nonsense.100  According to this reading, “it is a 
mistake to think that there is anything informative about nonsense. 
Nonsense is nonsense and to think of the Tractatus as showing some 
essential feature of reality, which reality has all right, but which we cannot 
say or think it has, is to make Wittgenstein chicken out.”101 The purpose of 
the Tractatus is therefore therapeutic, rather than demonstrative.102 It seeks 
to cure us of the pointless and potentially harmful effort of trying to find 
meaning in nonsense.103 On this reading, “the whole talk of limits of 
                                                                                                                       
the ineffable reading, what cannot be said is not a position within language but some extra-
linguistic truths.”). The ineffable reading appears to be a matter of precedent in the Second 
Circuit. Cf. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The ideas and 
concepts embodied in visual art have the power to transcend . . . language limitations and 
reach beyond a particular language group to both the educated and the illiterate.”). 
98 WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 6.54 (“My propositions are 
elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when 
he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the 
ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)”).  
99 See, e.g., James Conant, Two Conceptions of Die Überwindung der Metaphysik: 
Carnap and Early Wittgenstein, in WITTGENSTEIN IN AMERICA 13 (T. McCarthy and S. C. 
Stidd eds. 2001); James Conant, Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early 
Wittgenstein, in THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN 149 (A. Crary & R. Read eds. 2000); James 
Conant, Must We Show What We Cannot Say?, in THE SENSES OF STANLEY CAVELL 242 
(R. Fleming & M. Payne eds. 1989); Cora Diamond, Throwing Away the Ladder: How to 
Read the Tractatus, in THE REALIST SPIRIT 179  (Cora Diamond, ed. 1991) [hereinafter 
Diamond, Throwing Away the Ladder]; Cora Diamond, Logical Syntax in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus, 55 PHIL. QUARTERLY 55 78 (2005). 
100 Edmund Dain, Contextualism and Nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 25(2) S. 
AFR. J. PHILOS. 91, 92 (2006) (“There are, for austerity, no logically distinct kinds of 
nonsense; all nonsense, logically speaking, is on a par.”). 
101 Brand, supra note 97, at 332 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It was 
Diamond who first wrote that the ineffable interpretation of Wittgenstein read the 
philosopher as “chickening out.” Diamond, Throwing Away the Ladder, supra note 99, at 
181. 
102 Marie McGinn, Between Metaphysics and Nonsense: Elucidation in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus, 49 PHIL. QUARTERLY 491 (1999); see also Brand, supra note 97, at 326 (“The 
say/show distinction is meant to liberate us from the mental torture of a mind obsessively 
occupied with itself, chasing after itself in a movement that is increasingly vacuous, 
isolated, and cold.”); Moore & Sullivan, supra note 60, at 179 (“There is nothing ineffable. 
There is only the temptation to see sense where it is lacking. Wittgenstein’s aim is 
therapeutic.”). 
103 Cheung, supra note 13, at 200 (concluding that, according to Diamond and Conant, 
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language is confused; there is nothing that language cannot say. Language 
can represent every possible fact in the world and there are no other-worldly 
facts.”104 After all, Wittgenstein himself said that “[t]he limits of my 
language mean the limits of my world.”105 And although Russell’s 
introduction to the book seems to support the ineffability reading, 
Wittgenstein thought that Russell had not “got hold of my main 
contention.”106 
In an effort to avoid joining a debate it wishes merely to describe, this 
brief description of the ineffable and resolute readings inevitably simplifies 
and flattens them. Subtleties abound; variations are common.107 The goal 
here is simply to suggest that nonsense can be cognitively illuminating—
meaningless speech, in other words, can have value as a means to truth. For 
adherents to the ineffable view, nonsense can demonstrate the existence of 
important put perhaps unsayable truths. Many artists describe their work as 
an effort to do just that.108 And for adherents to the resolute view, nonsense 
can be a tool to save us from useless and potentially misleading efforts to 
establish meaning where none can be found. It is therapeutic—intellectually 
and not just emotionally so. 
But high-level epistemological debates are not the only contexts in 
which nonsense can contribute to the marketplace of ideas. Much as 
                                                                                                                       
“the Tractatus is not trying to help anyone see any unsayable insights,” but that “the aim of 
the Tractatus is merely to liberate nonsense utterers from nonsense, and that this is to be 
achieved by the non-frame sentences serving as elucidations”). Conant, Elucidation and 
Nonsense, supra note 99, at 196 (“[T]he aim for the Tractarian elucidation is to reveal 
(through the employment of mere nonsense) that what appears to be substantial nonsense is 
mere nonsense.”).  
104 Brand, supra note 97, at 330.  
105 WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 5.6.  
106 As Wittgenstein wrote to Russell: “I’m afraid you haven’t got hold of my main 
contention to which the whole business of logical propositions is only a corollary. The 
main point is the theory of what can be expressed by a proposition—i.e., by language—
(and which comes to the same thing what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by 
proposition, but only shown; which I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy.” 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, LETTERS TO RUSSELL, KEYNES, AND MOORE 37 (G.H. von Wright 
ed., 1974). 
107 See, e.g., Brand, supra note 97, at 312 (defending an “existential-performative” 
reading of Wittgenstein, which would hold that “[t]here is a showing that is not a saying 
but what is shown is nothing beyond language; rather it is the very existence of language—
its ability to perform sense”); Cheung, supra note 13, at 199 n.13 (“The resolute reading 
allows numerous variants,” which have been classified “into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions 
based on their different views of the nature of the frame.”). 
108 Hegel, for one, believed that art was useful—albeit not as much as philosophy—as 
a guide to truth. See Nahmod, supra note 81, at 232 (citing GEORG FRIEDRICH HEGEL, 
PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART 15–16 (Osmaston trans. 1920)). 
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falsehood can demonstrate truth,109 nonsense can illuminate meaning by 
demonstrating its boundaries. The Tractatus is not unique in that regard. It 
has been said that Carroll created his nonsense verse “not to put anything in 
doubt or to entertain any new conceptual possibilities, but to remind us 
where sense is to be found.”110 So, too, can engaging with nonsense enable 
individuals to better comprehend truth and meaning. This is certainly the 
case with regard to art, which as discussed above is often overtly 
nonsensical. Even where it lacks meaning, such art can, as the Supreme 
Court has recognized, “affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of 
ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the 
subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”111 As 
William Charlton puts it, “whereas we outgrow play with spoons and 
handkerchiefs, our intellectual faculties will always benefit from the 
quickening effect of good nonsense.”112  
 
2. Autonomy 
 
The most potentially expansive theory of the First Amendment is that 
speech deserves constitutional protection because and to the degree that it 
furthers individual autonomy.113 Martin Redish, perhaps the most prominent 
defender of this view, has argued that “[a]ll forms of expression that further 
the self-realization value, which justifies the democratic system as well as 
                                                
109 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (“Even a false 
statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings 
about ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with 
error.’” (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 5, 20  
(Stefan Collini ed. 1989))); Mill, supra, at 23 (concluding that silencing speech “rob[s] the 
human race” because even when an opinion is false, its contrast with the truth will more 
clearly illuminate the latter); Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of 
Expression, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 1203, 1203 (2008) (“False statements often 
have value in themselves, and we should protect them even in some situations where we 
are not concerned with chilling truthful speech. . . . False speech, therefore, is valuable 
because it is an essential part of a larger system that works to increase society’s 
knowledge.”). 
110 Tilghman, supra note 18, at 262 
111 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (referring to motion pictures); see 
Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 77 (1996) (“Art can carry ideas and 
information, but it also goes beyond logical, rational and discursive communication. It 
provides a risk-free opportunity to live in other worlds, enlarging individual perspective 
and strengthening individual judgment.”). 
112 Charlton, supra note 4, at 360.  
113 There are potentially important distinctions within what I have called the autonomy 
view—some scholars trumpet the values of self-realization or self-fulfillment instead. For 
simplicity’s sake, I have grouped them together here.  
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free speech’s role in it, are deserving of full constitutional protection.”114 Ed 
Baker similarly argued that speech “should receive constitutional protection 
. . . because and to the extent that it is a manifestation of individual 
autonomy.”115 The expansiveness of the autonomy conception leaves its 
defenders with a vast territory to patrol, since nearly any act can be 
described as a manifestation of individual autonomy.  
The very breadth of the autonomy view comfortably encompasses many 
forms of meaningless speech, for nonsense can surely manifest autonomy 
whether or not it “develop[s] the rational faculties.”116 After all, much of 
what we think and feel is impossible to express in words.117 This may be a 
result of deficiencies in our shared language, our limited individual 
vocabularies, or “practical, social, or psychological impediments to our 
using even the linguistic resources available to us.”118 Whatever the reason 
for these limits, or whether we recognize when they are transgressed, our 
efforts to express what lies beyond them create a kind of nonsense—
statements that are unverifiable, fail to describe any possible states of 
affairs, or attempt to say what can only be shown.119 
And yet from the perspective of individual autonomy and self-
fulfillment, we may have very good reason not to pass over such things in 
silence. Though arguably nonsensical, beyond those limits may lie our 
chaotic, contradictory, and even “ineffable” selves.120 Efforts to represent 
                                                
114 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594 (1982). 
Tim Scanlon once defended a similar viewpoint, see e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972), but has since done his best to 
repudiate it. T.M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 97 
VA. L. REV. 541, 546 (2011) (“As someone who once made a mistaken appeal to autonomy 
as the centerpiece of a theory of freedom of expression, my position in the Dantean Inferno 
of free speech debates seems to be repeatedly assailed with misuses of this notion, no 
matter how I criticize them.”). 
115 C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 981 
(1997); see also C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of 
Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (1976) (arguing that the First Amendment protects 
speaker’s self-realization). 
116 Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 80 
(1989) (“[E]xpression may promote human flourishing in ways other than developing the 
rational faculties. Freedom of speech may allow the expression of powerful emotions and 
provide an outlet for the creative impulse in a variety of forms, including literature, drama, 
and the creative arts.”). 
117 Moore & Sullivan, supra note 60, at 173 (“Most of us have at one time or another 
found that we cannot express how we feel about something.”). 
118 Id. 
119 See infra Section II.A (describing conceptual approach, under which these would be 
considered nonsensical). 
120 Cf. Rosen, supra note 54 (“By the beginning of the twentieth century, when Hugo 
von Hofmannstahl, in the ‘Chandos Letter,’ asserted the inadequacy to express anything 
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them may lack meaning according to some definitions, but they are also a 
very important part of individual and social human development.121 Even 
Wittgenstein recognized that there was a kind of mystical value in some 
kinds of nonsense.122 
As a First Amendment matter, these issues—and the autonomy value of 
nonsense—are most salient with regard to artistic speech, the constitutional 
status of which has been a perennial problem for the First Amendment.123 
Some courts and scholars simply take it for granted that the Amendment 
must cover art, and do little to explain why.124 Perhaps equally common are 
efforts to suggest that art does in fact have constitutionally salient meaning. 
As Marci Hamilton notes, “[m]irroring the commentators’ approach, the 
Court tends to protect art only to the extent that it is a vehicle for ideas, 
especially political ideas.”125 For many works of art, this approach is 
perfectly adequate,126 particularly given the extremely expansive definitions 
of “meaning” that courts and scholars apply to art.127 But not all art can fit 
                                                                                                                       
profoundly individual and subjective, one of the first words to have completely lost its 
meaning for him was ‘freedom.’”). 
121 Hamilton, supra note 111, at 79 (“Self-preservation cannot be achieved merely by 
following principles; it depends on the realization of human potentials, and these can only 
be brought to light by literature, not by systematic discourse.” (quoting WOLFGANG ISER, 
THE ACT OF READING: A THEORY OF AESTHETIC RESPONSE 76 (1978))). 
122 See generally JAMES ROBERT ATKINSON, THE MYSTICAL IN WITTGENSTEIN’S 
EARLY WRITINGS (2009). 
123 Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 3 (2007) (“The 
Supreme Court has ruled that particular instances of art speech are protected expression, 
but has not supplied a satisfactory rationale for protecting art. . . . Major First Amendment 
theorists likewise have not devoted substantial attention to art speech.”). 
124 Tushnet, supra note 9, at 170 n.4 (“Much of the secondary literature on art and the 
First Amendment assumes art’s coverage and derives First Amendment rules to deal with 
specific problems.”); see, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 
251 (1903) (“A rule cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the paintings of 
Degas.”); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within . . . First 
Amendment protection.”). 
125 Hamilton, supra note 111, at 105. 
126 Id. at 108 (“Because a significant number of artworks can be construed to have 
discursive content, existing theories of art’s first amendment content undeniably provide 
protection to a degree.”); see COLIN MARTINDALE, THE CLOCKWORK MUSE: THE 
PREDICTABILITY OF ARTISTIC CHANGE 42–43 (1990) (“[T]he more meaningful something 
is, the better people like it. At least for artistically naïve observers, meaning is by far the 
most important determinant of preference.” (cited in Fromer, supra note 90, at 1478 n.253).  
127 See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (“[P]aintings, photographs, 
prints and sculptures . . . always communicate some idea or concept to those who view it, 
and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection.”); Eberle, supra note 123, at 7 
(“[A]rt speech is the autonomous use of the artist’s creative process to make and fashion 
form, color, symbol, image, movement or other communication of meaning that is made 
manifest in a tangible medium.”). 
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into the meaning-dependent model, no matter how far the concept of 
meaning is stretched, which raises what Hamilton describes as “the 
difficulty of explaining how a first amendment theory valuing speech for its 
rationally comprehensible ideas can comfortably accommodate the 
phenomenon of art.”128   
Perhaps instead we should take seriously the notion that some art is 
nonsensical.129 Indeed, if works of art contained articulable ideas, one 
suspects that they would be said and not sung.130 Tushnet puts the point 
powerfully, and with apt illustrations: 
To begin, many modern sculptors would deny that they 
“intend” to express anything in their work. Rather, they seek 
to explore the relation between shape and space, nothing 
more (or less). Nor . . . is the abjuration of any intent to 
express limited to sculptors. . . . Art as form—being rather 
than meaning—is not intended to communicate, even though 
it may sometimes do so. A related point is that sometimes 
artworks are engagements with a tradition. As such, it is not 
clear that they “mean” anything.131  
Rather than trying to impute meaning to such artistic speech, we could 
instead ask whether nonsense for nonsense’s sake—like art for art’s 
sake132—serves important First Amendment values.  
Among those values, autonomy is the most natural candidate. Surely 
one of the fundamental goals of artistic expression, after all, is to try to say 
or represent the inexpressible.133 To do so is to speak nonsense, and yet no 
one could doubt the importance of such nonsense to the autonomy and self-
development of those speaking it.134 It can serve the autonomy interests of 
viewers as well. Aesthetic judgments are part of the “pleasure of freedom 
                                                
128 Hamilton, supra note 111, at 103–04. 
129 See, e.g., HERBERT READ, ICON AND IDEA (1955) (arguing that art is not always the 
product of cognitive activity and that the icon sometimes precedes the idea). 
130 Hamilton, supra note 111, at 74 (quoting Isadora Duncan: “If I could say it, I 
wouldn’t have to dance it.”). 
131 Tushnet, supra note 9, at 188-189 (internal citations omitted). 
132 Piarowski v. Illinois Community College District 515, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 
1985) (concluding that Amendment protects “purely artistic” expression—“art for art’s 
sake”). 
133 Cf. Adler, supra note 10, at 1366 (internal citation omitted) (quoting post-modern 
painter David Salle as saying that his paintings are about “all the paintings I won’t make or 
can’t make.”). 
134 Tolstoy—whom Wittgenstein “admired and read constantly,” Brand, supra note 97, 
at 311—suggested that creating nonsense was perhaps the only thing that humans could do 
that their own creator could not. Id. (“God can do everything, it is true, but there is one 
thing he cannot do, and that is speak nonsense.”) (quoting LEO TOLSTOY, THE GOSPEL 
ACCORDING TO TOLSTOY (1992)). 
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itself,” and are in that way “disinterested and ruleless, unconstrained by . . . 
appetite” or “a master concept to which they must conform.”135 Art is 
therefore important for individual autonomy precisely because its lack of 
meaning removes it from the realm of knowledge.136 
This is not to say that the autonomy principle provides an unmitigated 
case for protecting nonsense. Some forms of covert nonsense can arguably 
interfere with individual autonomy, rather than advancing it. Misleading 
covert nonsense, for example, can further the autonomy of the person 
speaking it while simultaneously interfering with the autonomy of those 
tricked by it.137 Moreover, if autonomy is intertwined with rational 
cognition, covert nonsense might be a threat to autonomy, instead of a 
means to advance it. Many leading proponents of the autonomy approach 
seem to hold this view. Redish, for example, refers to “the instrumental 
value in developing individuals’ mental faculties so that they may reach 
their full intellectual potential.”138 Fred Schauer has similarly described the 
self-realization view of the Amendment as being based on the human 
potential for “personal growth, self-fulfillment, and the development of 
rational faculties.”139 If these views are correct, then autonomy is limited by 
rationality, and nonsense might lack constitutional salience precisely 
because it is not subject to analysis on the basis of its rationality. 
 
3. Democracy 
 
                                                
135 Anthony T. Kronman, Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 311, 324 
(1999). 
136 Id. (“Judgments of beauty are thus free in a twofold sense. They are neither driven 
by desire nor determined by a rule.”). See also Charlton, supra note 4, at 356–59 
(evaluating nonsense in terms of Kant’s three types of aesthetic effect—the beautiful, the 
sublime, and the funny—and concluding that the former provides the best “clue”); Harry 
Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 16 (1960) 
(“[B]eauty has constitutional status too, and . . . the life of the imagination is as important 
to the human adult as the life of the intellect.”); Nahmod, supra note 81, at 231 (“Because 
art is removed from knowledge and desire, it follows for Kant that art and the beautiful 
cannot express ideas or take positions.”). 
137 Cf. Allen Blair, A Matter of Trust: Should No-Reliance Clauses Bar Claims for 
Fraudulent Inducement of Contract?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 456 (2009) (“Neo-Kantians 
tend to agree that lying is an affront to autonomy. Lies interfere with the victim's rational 
deliberation and rob the victim of her prospects for making at least some sensible choices 
about a course of action or belief.”). 
138 MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30 (1984) 
(emphasis added). In his original defense of the autonomy position, Scanlon argued that, on 
a Millian approach, “the powers of a state are limited to those that citizens could recognize 
while still regarding themselves  as  equal, autonomous, rational  agents.” Scanlon, A 
Theory of Freedom of Expression, supra note 114, at 215.  
139 FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 49 (1982). 
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The final major First Amendment value is democracy. As with the 
autonomy and marketplace approaches, democratic theories of the First 
Amendment come in many forms. Perhaps most famously, Alexander 
Meiklejohn argued that the Amendment categorically protects political 
speech (and only political speech) against government interference.140 
Robert Bork took a similar, albeit narrower, view.141 More recently, Robert 
Post has argued that the primary value animating the First Amendment is 
that of “democratic legitimation”: the notion that “First Amendment 
coverage should extend to all efforts deemed normatively necessary for 
influencing public opinion.”142 
Because democratic approaches to the First Amendment seem to be 
based on the content of speech acts,143 it might not be immediately apparent 
how nonsense—which lacks cognitive content of any kind—can be entitled 
to protection. After all, nonsense does not directly convey information 
about voting. And yet many people with strong incentive to think about the 
issue seem to believe that nonsense and democracy are connected. The 
leaders of totalitarian states, for example, often ban nonrepresentational and 
nonsensical art.144 Sheldon Nahmod points to the Soviet Union, whose 
leaders believed that “art should only serve to reinforce socialist ideals and 
thereby inculcate appropriate behavior; nonrepresentational art was 
                                                
140 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
94 (1948) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH] (“The guarantee given by the First 
Amendment is not, then, assured to all speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, 
directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal—only, therefore, to the 
consideration of matters of public interest.”); see also id. at 255–57 (arguing that the First 
Amendment encompasses all “public” speech that enables citizens to participate in 
democratic governance). As noted above, Meiklejohn considered this approach broad 
enough to include “novels and dramas and paintings and poems.” Id. at 263. 
141 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 29 (1971) (arguing that the First Amendment protects only “criticisms of public 
officials and policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional 
provisions and speech addressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country”).  
142 POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, at 18.  
143 See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 140, at 26–27. Because Post 
focuses on media of communication, this is not necessarily true of Post’s approach, though 
elsewhere I have questioned whether his theory can really avoid an inquiry into speech’s 
content. Joseph Blocher, Public Discourse, Expert Knowledge, and the Press, 87 U. WASH. 
L. REV. 409, 417-23 (2012). 
144 See Hamilton, supra note 111, at 98–100 (discussing examples from China, Eastern 
Europe, Nazi Germany, and elsewhere); see also Eberle, supra note 123, at 12–13; cf. 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music is one of the oldest 
forms of human expression. From Plato’s discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state 
in our own times, rules have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the 
emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state.”). 
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considered decadent, bourgeois and dangerous.”145 Whether or not that fear 
is well-founded, it certainly is not unique to Russia, nor even to totalitarian 
states. As Hamilton notes, “[c]onventional readings of Plato, for example, 
indicate that he believed that art should be censored because it threatens 
order and stability.”146 Speech, including art, need not be meaningful in 
order to destabilize. 
But this only explains why some states might seek to suppress nonsense, 
not why democracies should protect it. What positive democratic value does 
overt nonsense serve? Perhaps, like art, nonsense can help cultivate the kind 
of citizen on whom a well-functioning democracy depends. Meiklejohn, for 
example, argued that “[l]iterature and the arts must be protected by the First 
Amendment. They lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation 
and response to the values out of which the riches of the general welfare are 
created.”147 This may be a bit of a stretch even on its own terms, but it does 
suggest a possible connection between nonsense and democracy. Just as 
engaging with nonsense can help people perceive cognitive truths in the 
marketplace for ideas,148 perhaps it can also inform their understanding and 
appreciation of what Brandeis referred to as “political truth.”149  
A second possibility is that overt nonsense serves as a kind of “safety 
valve”—a way to release what might otherwise become dangerous 
dissent.150 On this reading, speech “is an essential mechanism for 
maintaining the balance between stability and change.”151 The Merry 
Pranksters, whose escapades in their brightly-decorated bus were 
catalogued in The Electric Kool Aid Acid Test,152 often “tootled the 
multitudes,” which referred “to the way a Prankster would stand with a flute 
on the bus’s roof and play sounds to imitate people’s various reactions to 
the bus.”153 Such activity probably did not convey any particularized 
message or “idea.” But without that outlet, perhaps the Pranksters’ 
basically-nonsensical hijinks would have devolved into something more 
                                                
145 Nahmod, supra note 81, at 225; see also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 172 (noting 
“Nazi Germany’s suppression of ‘degenerate’ art and Soviet Russia’s promotion of 
socialist realist art at the expense of abstraction”). 
146 Hamilton, supra note 111, at 76.  
147 See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 256–57. 
148 See supra 109-112 and accompanying text. 
149 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
150 See, e.g., Stephen G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially 
Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008) (describing safety valve theory).  
151 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970). 
152 TOM WOLFE, THE ELECTRIC KOOL AID ACID TEST (1968). 
153 Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, Ken Kesey, Author of ‘Cuckoo’s Nest,’ Who Defined 
the Psychedelic Era, Dies at 66, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001. See WOLFE, supra note 152, 
at Chapter 8 (“Tootling the Multitudes”). 
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destructive. 
A related argument for extending constitutional protection to nonsense 
draws on institutional considerations that are especially salient for, but not 
specific to, democracy conceptions of the First Amendment: that the 
Amendment must protect nonsense in order to fully insulate valuable and 
meaningful speech. The Supreme Court has long recognized that “First 
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.”154 This proposition 
is based on the belief that speech “is delicate and vulnerable, as well as 
supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their 
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.”155 
Doctrine has been significantly shaped by that belief, perhaps most 
prominently in the context of First Amendment standing doctrine, which 
permits people to attack on free speech grounds laws that would concededly 
be constitutional as applied to them,156 so long as the law reaches a 
substantial amount of protected speech.157  
The nothingness of nonsense could be exactly the kind of breathing 
space that sense needs in order to thrive. After all, the Court has recognized 
that if only truthful speech were protected, people would “tend to make only 
statements which ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone.’”158 Perhaps if only 
meaningful speech were protected, people would shy away from pushing 
the boundaries of logic and language, for fear of speaking unprotected 
nonsense. As the Court held in Cohen, “forbid[ding] particular words . . . 
also run[s] a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”159 
Nonsense might merit protection precisely because of its instrumental value 
in protecting meaningful speech.  
 
II.  THE MEANING OF MEANING FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
 
The discussion up until this point has described an important but under-
explored category of speech—nonsense—and made a preliminary case for 
its constitutional protection. In the course of doing so, it has flanked another 
target: the very concept of meaning itself. This is dangerous quarry, 
particularly when wounded by the apparent threat to its claim on the First 
Amendment’s territory, and is not to be approached incautiously. With due 
concern for the hazards, though, it is difficult to imagine a better way to 
                                                
154 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
155 Id. 
156 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
157 Id. at 615. 
158 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
159 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. 
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consider meaning than by, as the preceding discussion has, exploring its 
absence. The goal of this Part is to use that analysis to confront the meaning 
of meaning for First Amendment purposes. 
It would be easier, perhaps, to avoid the issue by simply saying that 
meaning does not matter for the First Amendment. But a wide range of 
doctrine and scholarship suggest that the easy road is foreclosed, and that 
meaning—generally equated with ideas, viewpoints, or content—is a 
necessary ingredient of constitutionally salient speech. As John Greenman 
notes, “[f]requently, behavior is said to be covered by the First Amendment 
if it conveys ‘ideas’ or ‘information.’”160 This meaning-dependent approach 
is embedded in constitutional doctrine in various ways, and has been 
buttressed by thoughtful scholarship. Peter Tiersma, for example, proposes 
that “the first requirement for communication by conduct is that the conduct 
be meaningful, most often as a matter of convention. This is simply an 
extension of a basic principle of language: a speaker normally cannot use 
sounds to communicate unless the sounds have some meaning attached to 
them.”161 Likewise, Melville Nimmer’s influential account of symbolic 
speech holds that “symbolic speech requires not merely that given conduct 
results in a meaning effect, but that the actor causing such conduct must 
intend such a meaning effect by his conduct.”162 
But the meaning-dependent approach also raises difficult problems for 
the reasons suggested in Part I: nonsense is pervasive, and much of it has a 
strong relationship to the First Amendment’s core values. Moreover, despite 
their apparent insistence on the importance of meaning, courts and scholars 
have done very little to establish what meaning means.163 That imprecision, 
                                                
160 Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347. See also Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: 
Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” 
and the Unchartered Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005) (“Under nearly every 
theory of free speech, the right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate—to 
persuade and to inform people through the content of one’s message.”). 
161 Tiersma, supra note 3, at 1559. Under Tiersma’s two-part test for determining 
whether nonverbal communication falls within the freedom of speech: “First, action must 
have meaning, either by way of convention or in some other manner. Second, the actor 
must intend to communicate by means of the action.” Id. at 1526. “An intent to 
communicate obviously requires an intent to convey information.” Id. at 1561. 
162 Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 37. Nimmer explained elsewhere that 
“[t]he meaning effect is a signal that registers in the mind of at least one observer. The 
nonmeaning effect is the physical effect of the act and is not dependent upon the reaction of 
other minds.” MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3.06[C], at 3–45 
(1989). As noted above, despite its reliance on meaning Nimmer considered his approach 
broad enough to reach artistic speech lacking verbal and cognitive content. Nimmer, 
Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 35.  
163 Cf. Greenman, supra note 3, at 1338-39 (“Everybody knows that communication is 
important, but nobody knows how to define it. The best scholars refer to it. Free-speech 
law protects it. Smart people tell us that the Internet should be structured to promote it. But 
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in turn, provides space to craft a doctrinal and theoretical apparatus that 
allows meaning to play a central role in First Amendment discourse without 
completely denying constitutional coverage to nonsense. Even so, this is no 
easy task, for the necessary tools are scarce and scattered throughout the 
First Amendment’s messy workshop.  
Fortunately, craftsmen in adjacent workshops can provide useful 
guidance. The relationship between meaning and language has been the 
central obsession of analytic philosophy for the better part of a century. Of 
course, analytic philosophers are primarily concerned with determining 
what can meaningfully be said, not what kinds of speech are or should be 
protected from government sanction. But with regard to the specific issue of 
meaning, their hard-won advances are directly relevant to the questions that 
constitutional law has set for itself. Moreover, as the following discussion 
shows, echoes of their efforts can already be heard in First Amendment 
discourse.  
Two major schools of thought have emerged, which with regrettably 
necessary simplification can be called the “conceptual” and “use” 
approaches to meaning. The former, associated with early Wittgenstein, 
Russell, and logical positivism, finds meaning in the connection between 
language and extra-linguistic concepts.164 Language that fails to represent 
such concepts is nonsensical. Some First Amendment discourse implicitly 
utilizes such an approach. The authorities cited above, for example, 
generally employ a more-or-less conceptual approach to meaning by 
searching for “ideas”165 or “content.”166 The frequent scholarly explorations 
of nonrepresentational art also seem motivated by a conceptual approach, 
for their issue is only distinct to the degree that representationalism itself is 
constitutionally salient.  
The lessons of analytic philosophy suggest that these are the wrong 
questions to ask. As Paul Chevigny explains: 
 Having abandoned the view of language as a ‘copy’ of 
the ‘real world,’ a set of names for objects, and assertions 
that have meaning only to the extent that they faithfully 
represent reality, philosophers increasingly think of language 
as a system of discourse in which assertions can have 
‘meaning’ and be ‘true’ not as representations of ‘reality’ but 
                                                                                                                       
no one—no scholar or judge—has successfully captured it. Few have even tried.”). 
164 “Conceptual” is used here as a rough and imperfect label for many related schools 
of thought, from foundationalism to logical positivism. Paying the inevitable costs of over-
simplification nevertheless seems worthwhile, since my purpose here is not to illuminate 
anything specific to those philosophies, but simply to show how, generally speaking, they 
might inform the First Amendment. 
165 Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347. 
166 Volokh, supra note 160, at 1304. 
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as ideas for which good reasons can be found in other parts 
of the system of discourse.167 
That is, if meaning is relevant for First Amendment purposes it must be 
found in the way language is used, not in what it represents. The following 
discussion attempts to show what that entails as a constitutional matter and 
why it represents an improvement over the conceptual approach. And yet 
bringing use meaning to the forefront of First Amendment doctrine drags 
with it a new set of problems, including the inherent difficulty of identifying 
the “language games” that imbue speech with meaning. 
The goal of this Part is to suggest how First Amendment discourse and 
doctrine can fruitfully utilize the concept of meaning, not to fully define 
speech, say anything new about analytic philosophy, or—heaven forbid—
provide an original or comprehensive reading of Wittgenstein.168 The 
following accounts of analytic philosophy will feel familiar, if simplified, to 
philosophers; the First Amendment theory and doctrine will be familiar to 
legal scholars. Indeed, this is far from the first article to suggest connections 
between them. But its angle of approach—through the region of nonsense—
is novel for First Amendment scholarship, and it aims to provide a fresh and 
useful, if complicated and imperfect, way to think about meaning for First 
Amendment purposes. 
 
A.  Conceptual Meaning 
 
In 1899, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote: “We must think things not 
words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into the facts for 
which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true.”169 For a man 
whose contribution to American jurisprudence can largely be measured by 
his total mastery of words,170 this might come as something of a surprise. 
                                                
167 Chevigny, supra note 85, at 162. 
168 Wittgenstein’s influence is so magnetic that the very act of citing him has become a 
language game of its own. See Steven L. Winter, For What It’s Worth, 26 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 789, 796–97 (1992) (noting signaling value of citations to Wittgenstein “in some 
legal academic circles”); see also Dennis W. Arrow, “Rich,” “Textured,” and “Nuanced”: 
Constitutional “Scholarship” and Constitutional Messianism at the Millenium, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 149, 149 n.1a (1999) (positing same phenomenon with regard to law review editors). 
169 Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 
460 (1899); see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 9, 1925), 
in 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 738 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (noting how difficult it is 
to “think accurately—and think things not words”) (quoted in Post, Recuperating, supra 
note 34, at 1250 (“Our First Amendment jurisprudence has become increasingly a doctrine 
of words merely, not of things.”)). 
170 Richard A. Posner, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER 
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. xvii (Richard A. Posner ed., The University 
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The remark suggests that the meaning of words lies in “the facts for which 
they stand.” In that way, it is emblematic of what might be called the 
“conceptual” approach to meaning—one that locates meaning in the 
relationship between language and extra-linguistic concepts.171 Words that 
do not denote such concepts are nonsensical and, if the doctrinal 
descriptions set out above are accurate, fall outside the boundaries of the 
First Amendment. But as the remainder of this Section shows, such a 
conceptual approach has serious defects as a guide for constitutional law. 
Holmes was a pragmatist,172 and though his circle of scientifically and 
philosophically inclined friends was broad and deep,173 it did not 
necessarily include those in Vienna and Cambridge who were concurrently 
exploring the relationship between “things” and “words.” Even as Holmes 
was penning his monumentally influential free speech opinions, and 
essentially giving the First Amendment its first normative theory,174 those 
thinkers—Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein prominent but not 
alone among them—were probing the meaning of meaning itself.175  
In the early 1900s, Russell was perhaps the world’s preeminent logician 
and mathematician. His Principia Mathematica was published in the 1910s, 
just a few years before Holmes laid the normative foundations of the First 
Amendment. As part of his wide-ranging intellectual explorations, Russell 
contemplated what it means for a statement to have meaning. He eventually 
came to believe that statements are meaningful, even if not verifiable, so 
long as they express a possible state of affairs: “A sentence ‘p’ is significant 
if ‘I believe that p’ or ‘I doubt that’ or etc., can describe a perceived fact.”176 
                                                                                                                       
of Chicago Press 1992). 
171 This does not mean, of course, that each word has only one thing to which it is 
connected. As Holmes noted elsewhere, “[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and 
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 38 S. Ct. 
158, 159 (1918). Conversely, the same “thing” may be connected to multiple words, as in 
Gottlob Frege’s famous example of the “Morning Star” and “Evening Star,” both of which 
refer to Venus. 
172 See generally Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
787, 799 (1989) 
173 See generally LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2002) (describing social 
and intellectual “club” that included such luminaries as Holmes, William James, and 
Charles Peirce). 
174 Post, Reconciling, supra note 75, at 2356. 
175 Starting with Russell and Cambridge means omitting any number of important 
thinkers, including Gottlob Frege and the Austrian logical positivists, who arguably 
deserve credit for the very creation of analytic philosophy. However costly, such omissions 
are necessary for the sake of brevity and clarity. Fuller accounts can be found in Richard 
Rorty, The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method (1992). 
176 BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH 181 (1940) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Thus a statement like “The King of France is bald” can be meaningful 
because it denotes a concept, even though the thing it denotes does not 
exist.177 Statements that fail to denote are nonsensical. Russell’s famous 
example of such nonsense was the statement “Quadruplicity drinks 
procrastination.”178 
At around the same time as he was developing this approach to 
meaning, Russell took on a new pupil, whom he at first referred to as “[m]y 
ferocious German . . . armour-plated against all assaults of reasoning.”179 
Within one term, Russell learned that his German was Austrian and quite 
capable of his own assaultive reasoning. Russell was enraptured: “I love 
him & feel he will solve the problems I am too old to solve.”180 The 
ferocious Austrian was, of course, Wittgenstein. For him, as Dennis 
Paterson says, “all philosophical problems [were] ultimately problems of 
language.”181 Although the focus on problems of language was consistent 
throughout Wittgenstein’s career, his approach to them can be divided into 
two basically distinct phases, only the first of which fits the conceptual 
mold described here. For the “early” Wittgenstein, author of the 
spectacularly impenetrable Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, sense consisted 
in “a determinate relation between a proposition and an independent state of 
affairs.”182  
In order to explore their “relation,” Wittgenstein focused on the 
relationship between thought and expression. As the preface or “frame” of 
the Tractatus explained:  
The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather—
not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in 
order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to 
think both sides of the limit (we should therefore have to 
think what cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only 
be drawn in language and what lies on the side of the limit 
will be simply nonsense.183  
That limit represents the boundary of both meaning and of reality. As 
Wittgenstein explained in the koan-like propositions of the book itself: “The 
proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the reality 
                                                
177 See generally Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 MIND 479 (1905).  
178 RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY, supra note 176, at 165. 
179 RAY MONK, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: THE DUTY OF GENIUS 40 (1990) 
180 Id. at 41. 
181 Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 938. 
182 Brand, supra note 97, at 314. See also Kavka, supra note 73, at 1457 (reviewing 
HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE (1972)) (concluding that the 
Tractatus is based on the belief that “the function of language is to model or picture the 
world.”). 
183 WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, at Preface. 
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as we think it is.”184 Anything that is not a proposition is, strictly speaking, 
nonsense, for anything that is not a proposition fails to present a picture of 
reality: “Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition 
has a name meaning.”185 It follows that there is no way to comprehend or 
create reality but through language, and thus “[t]he limits of my language 
mean the limits of my world.”186  
This does not necessarily mean, however, that all concepts are reducible 
to language.187 Wittgenstein was obsessed with the notion that some things 
“cannot be expressed by proposition, but only shown; which I believe is the 
cardinal problem of philosophy.”188 As Elizabeth Anscombe, a 
distinguished philosopher and former student of Wittgenstein’s, later 
explained: 
[A]n important part is played in the Tractatus by the things 
which, though they cannot be “said”, are yet “shewn” or 
“displayed”. That is to say: it would be right to call them 
“true” if, per impossible, they could be said; in fact they 
cannot be called true, since they cannot be said, but “can be 
shewn”, or “are exhibited”, in the propositions saying the 
various things that can be said.189 
Whatever their importance, attempts to say these things inevitably result in 
nonsense. Holmes seemed to have something similar in mind when he 
suggested the difference between thinking things and thinking words.190  
Though Wittgenstein himself would apparently later abandon it,191 the 
effort to find meaning in the relationship between words and things 
certainly did not end with the Tractatus. The influence of the conceptual 
approach is palpable in the work of A.J. Ayer, the great English logical 
positivist, whose Language, Truth, and Logic defends among other things 
the “verifiability principle.”192 That principle holds that statements are 
nonsensical where they are not analytically or empirically verifiable.193 A 
                                                
184 Id. at § 4.01. 
185 Id. § 3.3. 
186 Id. § 3.032 (“It is impossible to present in language anything that ‘contradicts logic’ 
as it is in geometry to present by its coordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space 
or to give the coordinates of a point that does not exist.”). 
187 See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (describing debate between 
“ineffable” and “resolute” readings of Wittgenstein). 
188 DAVID G. STERN, WITTGENSTEIN ON MIND AND LANGUAGE, 79-70 (1996). 
189 ANSCOMBE, supra note 94, at 162. 
190 See Holmes, supra note 169, at 460. 
191 See infra 215-216 and accompanying text. 
192 ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1952). 
193 Id. at 44. Chevigny, supra note 85, at 163 (“If a proposition was not true or false by 
definition or did not give rise to an empirical prediction that could, in principle, be verified, 
the proposition was meaningless.”). 
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similar focus on verifiability seems to underlie popular intuitions about the 
relationship between meaning and truth. For example, “the threshold for 
inclusion in Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth—that is, whether readers 
are able to check that material added to Wikipedia has already been 
published by a reliable source, not whether we think it is true.”194  
The influence of the conceptual approach extends, albeit uncredited, to 
First Amendment doctrine itself. This is perhaps most apparent in what 
John Greenman calls the Supreme Court’s “ideaism”—the principle that 
“behavior is . . . covered by the First Amendment if it conveys ‘ideas’ or 
‘information.’”195 The notion that ideas—cognitive meaning, in other 
words—are the focus of the First Amendment is so often repeated that it 
might sometimes pass unnoticed. In New York Times v. Sullivan,196 the 
Supreme Court explained that the Amendment’s “constitutional safeguard . 
. . ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people.’”197 Since then, 
the Court has often invoked the principle that “[t]he First Amendment . . . 
embodies ‘our profound national commitment to the free exchange of 
ideas.’”198 In Miller v. California,199 for example, the Court seemed to 
suggest that ideas are so important that the existence of one is sufficient for 
constitutional coverage: “All ideas having even the slightest redeeming 
social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas 
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the 
[First Amendment’s] guarantees.”200 By the same logic, the Court has also 
indicated that putative speech acts such as fighting words and obscenity 
essentially fall outside the boundaries of the First Amendment in part 
because they “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”201 
                                                
194 Wikipedia: Verifiability, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia: 
Verifiability (quoted in POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, at 8 (2012)). 
195 Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347-48. 
196 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
197 Id. at 269 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); see also Mosley 
v. Police Dep’t, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (“[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to 
express any thought, free from government censorship.” (quoting New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (citations omitted)).  
198 New York State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008) (“The First 
Amendment creates a marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may 
compete without government interference”.); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) 
(“The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’ . . . .”). 
199 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
200 Id. at 20 (internal citation omitted).  
201 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). It also matters that 
such speech acts “are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing 
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A conceptual approach to meaning similarly seems to animate some of 
the Court’s efforts to define what kinds of non-verbal conduct qualify for 
First Amendment coverage. By now “[i]t is well settled that the First 
Amendment’s protections extend to nonverbal ‘expressive conduct’ or 
‘symbolic speech.’”202 And meaning seems to be the ingredient that makes 
that extension possible. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, for example, the Court indicated that expressive conduct (in that 
case, saluting a flag) is “speech” for constitutional purposes because it 
conveys “ideas.”203 A similar premise seems to animate Spence v. 
Washington,204 the Court’s most direct effort to define the essential 
elements that transform sound into speech. In that case, the Court set out to 
evaluate whether conduct is “sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication to fall within the scope” of the First Amendment.205 The 
test it created asks whether “an intent to convey a particularized message 
was present, and whether the likelihood was great that the message would 
be understood by those who viewed it.”206 Conduct that satisfies both 
prongs of this test is considered to be expression. Spence therefore 
effectively doubles down on the importance of conceptual meaning, 
requiring both that the speaker intend to convey it (in “particularized” form, 
                                                                                                                       
Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (denying First Amendment protection to fraud, 
on the basis that “the ‘intentional lie’ is ‘no essential part of any exposition of ideas’”).  
202 Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1114 n.18 (2005).   
203 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (“Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of 
communicating ideas.”). 
204 Tiersma, supra note 3, at 1537 (referring to Spence as “the only real test that the 
Court has articulated to identify ‘speech’ in the First Amendment sphere”). Tiersma’s use 
of “only” was probably accurate at the time, but now needs some qualification, since 
Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 
(1995), and other cases seem to have replaced or at the very least altered Spence’s test. For 
example, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 
(2006), rather than applying (or even citing) Spence, the Court asked whether the activity at 
issue was “inherently expressive,” such that a viewer could understand its meaning without 
further explanation. Id. at 66. Excluding military recruiters from campus in order to express 
disagreement with the military’s policies did not meet this test, the Court found, because 
such exclusion might well be the result of room scarcity. Id. 
205 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“Johnson’s burning of the flag was conduct ‘sufficiently imbued 
with elements of communication’ to implicate the First Amendment.” (quoting Spence, 418 
U.S. at 409)). But see Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[F]lag 
burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar . . . .”). 
206 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11; see R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in 
the First Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 
1238 (2010) (“In the absence of the speaker’s intent to promote some more or less 
determinate understanding, we may be skeptical that speech in the constitutional sense is 
present.”). 
40 BLOCHER – SPEECH AND MEANING [26-Jan-13 
no less), and also that there be a “great” likelihood that the audience 
understand it. 
Despite its frequent appearances in First Amendment doctrine, the 
conceptual approach to meaning is a poor guide to what speech the First 
Amendment actually does or should protect. Indeed, the conceptual 
approach to meaning, combined with the meaning-dependent approach to 
the First Amendment discussed above,207 leads to all the problems of under-
inclusion suggested by Part I. As Greenman points out, ideaism “fails to 
predict what the First Amendment actually covers.”208 In O’Brien v. United 
States,209 the Court clarified that the mere intent to convey meaning is not 
sufficient for First Amendment coverage: “We cannot accept the view that 
an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever 
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”210  
Nor is a connection between language and concept necessary for the 
Amendment’s protections to attach. Music, for example, is clearly protected 
by the First Amendment,211 even though a great deal of it does not convey 
meaning in any standard sense. As Richard Posner writes, “[e]ven if 
‘thought,’ ‘concept,’ ‘idea,’ and ‘opinion’ are broadly defined, these are not 
what most music conveys; and even if music is regarded as a language, it is 
not a language for encoding ideas and opinions.”212 In other ways, too, the 
Constitution protects efforts to say the unsayable. Justice Harlan explained 
in Cohen v. California that “much linguistic expression serves a dual 
communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively 
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as 
well.”213  
                                                
207 See supra 160-162 and accompanying text. 
208 Greenman, supra note 3, at 1348. See also Post, Recuperating, supra note 34, at 
1252 (showing that Spence is overinclusive); Rubenfeld, supra note 35, at 773 (showing 
that Spence is underinclusive). 
209 391 U.S. 367 (1968) 
210 Id. at 376 (analyzing constitutional status of social dancing). 
211 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music, as a form of 
expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.”); see also Reed 
v. Vill. of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 950 (7th Cir. 1983) (“If the defendants passed an 
ordinance forbidding the playing of rock and roll music . . . they would be infringing a First 
Amendment right even if the music had no political message—even if it had no words.” 
(internal citations omitted)).  
212 Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., 
concurring), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); see also 
David Munkittrick, Music as Speech: A First Amendment Category Unto Itself, 62 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 665, 668 (2010). But see Rosen, supra note 54, (“Felix Mendelssohn found the 
meaning of music more precise, not less, than language, but that is because music means 
what it is, not what it says.”). 
213 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (emphasis added).  
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Under the conceptual approach to meaning, expression of the 
“inexpressible” is by definition nonsensical.214 But as Justice Harlan 
suggests and Part I argues, it is also properly covered by the First 
Amendment. It follows that the conceptual approach to meaning, whatever 
its intuitive appeal, is a poor guide to the boundaries of the First 
Amendment. If it is to matter, “meaning” must lie elsewhere than in the 
relationship between speech and concepts. 
 
B.  Use Meaning 
 
The best place to begin constructing an alternative to the conceptual 
approach associated with Russell and Wittgenstein is with Wittgenstein 
himself. His later work—especially the enormously influential concept of 
language games—reshaped the whole of analytic philosophy, putting it on 
the “linguistic turn” that led to speech act theory, ordinary language 
philosophy, and a host of other important developments. In them emerges a 
new way of thinking about language and meaning that is ultimately a better 
guide for the First Amendment. 
After leaving philosophical work behind for more than a decade, 
Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929 and took a new approach to the 
relationship between language, meaning, and the world. This work 
culminated in the posthumous publication of Philosophical Investigations. 
It was here that Wittgenstein “reject[ed] the search for a unified account of 
language’s internal logic, which had occupied the bulk . . . the 
Tractatus.”215 Indeed, he described the Philosophical Investigations as a 
rejoinder to “what logicians have said about the structure of language. 
(Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)”216  
Instead of the picture theory of meaning that animated his earlier work, 
Wittgenstein now focused on “language games” as defining the limits of 
meaning and, therefore, the world: “I shall call the whole, consisting of the 
language and the actions into which it is woven, the language-game.”217 The 
term, he said, was “meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”218 The 
                                                
214 AYER, supra note 192, at 118 (“If a mystic admits that the object of his vision is 
something which cannot be described, then he must also admit that he is bound to talk 
nonsense when he describes it.”). 
215 Ian Bartrum, Constructing the Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution of 
Federalist 10, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 11 (2010).  
216 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 11-12. 
217 Id. at 7. 
218 Id. at 23; see also Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of ‘Place’ in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2613 (2007) (“‘Form of life’ 
is a technical term meant to convey the multiplicity of both possible ways of living and 
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nature of these games became Wittgenstein’s focus for the rest of his life. 
As Patterson explains, “The central tenet of Wittgenstein’s writing after 
1929 is that knowledge is not achieved by the individual subject’s grasp of a 
connection between word and object. Rather, knowledge turns out to be the 
grasp of the topography of a word’s uses in activities into which language is 
woven.”219 
The language games approach locates meaning in language’s use, not in 
its representation of the world. As Wittgenstein put in the Philosophical 
Investigations, “[f]or a large class of cases—though not for all—in which 
we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a 
word is its use in the language.”220 The way to identify meaning, therefore, 
is not necessarily to ask whether a putative speaker has given content to 
signs in his propositions, but rather whether he has followed the rules of the 
relevant language game. Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson explain: “As a 
tradition now identified with Wittgenstein and his successors insists, there 
are only ‘practices,’ each constituted by inchoate and unformalizable 
standards that establish one’s statements . . . as ‘legitimately assertable’ by 
persons within the interpretive community that constitutes the practice in 
question.”221 
The tradition to which Balkin and Levinson refer is now dominant, or at 
least ascendant, in analytic philosophy. Thus the later Wittgenstein is 
important not only on his own terms, but because he shaped so many other 
philosophical developments throughout the past century.222 The branches on 
that tree are too numerous to count and too complex to describe, but include 
the work of Paul Grice,223 the speech act theory associated most closely 
                                                                                                                       
possible ways of seeing and responding to the world. The ability to speak a language is the 
ability to engage in practices within a form of life in which that language has meaning.”). 
219 Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270, 303–
04 (1993) (internal citation omitted); see also Fiss, supra note 29, at 177. 
220 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 43. See also 
Jonathan Yovel, What is Contract Law ‘About’? Speech Act Theory and a Critique of 
‘Skeletal Promises’, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 939 (2000) (noting that Wittgenstein and the 
theories of performative language that owe him a debt “all share a basic insight: that 
language is not primarily about meaning in the traditional, semantical sense associated with 
representationalism (and much of standard structural linguistics). Rather, in this view, 
language is primarily about action—speech and texts are acts, and they perform things in 
the social world and bring about different kinds of effects.”). 
221 Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1597, 1604 (1991); 
222 Chevigny, supra note 85, at 162. 
223 Grice’s basic argument—vastly oversimplified—was that for A to mean something 
by doing X, X must be uttered with an intention of producing some belief or effect in the 
listener, B, by means of B’s recognition of A’s intent. See generally H.P. Grice, Meaning, 
66 PHIL. REV. 377 (1957) (describing idea of M-meaning). Later, Grice would further 
develop the idea of speaker meaning via analyzing sentences as units of meaning and 
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with J.L. Austin and John R. Searle,224 and ordinary language philosophy.225  
Most importantly for present purposes, the use meaning approach has 
gained traction in First Amendment doctrine and scholarship. Robert Post, 
for example, argues that Marcel Duchamp’s The Fountain—a urinal turned 
on its side—is properly recognized as artistic speech precisely because of 
the shared norms of the artistic community.226 This is because it is a “form[] 
of communication that sociologically we recognize as art.”227 Taking a 
similar approach, Amy Adler points to the example of Annie Sprinkle, a 
performance artist who also works in the pornography industry: “When 
asked if anything made Sprinkle’s performance at the Kitchen [Center for 
the Performing Arts] ‘art’ and her performance for Screw [Magazine] 
‘pornography,’ a spokesman for the Kitchen said, ‘Here it was performed in 
an art context.’”228 These are arguments rooted in use, not in representation. 
Such examples raise the question of whether the use approach provides 
any boundaries whatsoever between meaning and nonsense. Indeed, if not 
applied rigorously, the fuzziness inherent in evaluating language games and 
social practices can be made to shield nearly any act or utterance.229 But 
                                                                                                                       
differentiating between indicative and imperative meaning. H.P. Grice, Utterer’s Meaning, 
Sentence Meaning, and Word-Meaning, 4 FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE 225-42 (1968).  
224 See generally, J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); JOHN R. 
SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING (1985); JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY (1983); 
JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969).  
As suggested by the title of Austin’s seminal How To Do Things With Words, the 
central insight of speech act theory is that speech can do things, as for example when a 
person says “I am sorry.” Uttering those words does not merely report meaning by 
describing a situation or a state of mind, but actually performs the act of apologizing. The 
same can be said of promises, AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, supra, at 10, the 
words “I do” in the context of a wedding ceremony, id. at 6, or—as Akhil Amar has 
suggested, channeling Austin—the phrase “We the People . . . do ordain and establish” in 
the Preamble of the United States Constitution. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2005).   
225 Toril Moi, “They Practice Their Trades in Different Worlds”: Concepts in 
Poststructuralism and Ordinary Language Philosophy, 40(4) NEW LITERARY HISTORY 
801, 802 (2009) (defining ordinary language philosophy as “the philosophical tradition 
after Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin as established in [Stanley] Cavell’s work”). See 
generally STANLEY CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? (2d ed 2002). 
226 Post, Recuperating, supra note 34, at 1253–54; see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital 
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information 
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004). 
227 Post, Reply, supra note 15, at 621. 
228 Adler, supra note 10, at 1370 (internal citation omitted). 
229 Cf. Lee Tien, Publishing Software As a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 629, 
648 (2000) (“[T]he Court seems to believe that every human act has ‘meaning,’ and thus 
may convey a ‘message.’”) (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989), in 
which the Court concluded that social dancing is not speech, even though “some kernel of 
expression” can be found in all human activity). 
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while use meaning is potentially more capacious with regard to meaning 
than the conceptual approach, it is not all-encompassing. By establishing a 
new approach to meaning, the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy simply 
creates a new and potentially richer approach to nonsense.230 Rather than 
arising from a disjunction between language and extra-linguistic facts, 
speech is nonsensical where it fails to adhere to the rules of the relevant 
language game.231 Jonathan Yovel explains that “one plays a language-
game by the act of following its rules; deviation from the rules is ‘not 
playing the game,’ which produces nonsense in relation to the language-
game in question.”232 Constraints on meaning are therefore inter-subjective 
and socially embedded, rather than dictated by the rules of formal logic. In 
other words, “for an utterance to be meaningful it must be possible in 
principle to subject it to public standards and criteria of correctness.”233 
This means that would-be speakers cannot simply declare their words to 
be meaningful, and that a “private language”—one whose “individual 
words . . . are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to 
his immediate private sensations”234—is nonsensical. Carroll provides the 
perfect illustration: 
“And only one for birthday presents, you know. There’s 
glory for you!” 
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’,” Alice said. 
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you 
don’t—till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down 
argument for you!’” 
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down 
                                                
230 Tilghman, supra note 18, at 256 (“Wittgenstein went on to provide a still richer 
exploration of nonsense in the Philosophical Investigations where he locates a craving for 
nonsense in certain deep aspects of our language and our life. It is this craving that he 
believes is responsible for much of traditional philosophy which, on his view, turns out to 
be grounded in conceptual confusion and therefore a kind of nonsense.”). 
231 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 18 (“It is only 
in a language that I can mean something by something.”). 
232 Yovel, supra note 220, at 941; see also Bartrum, supra note 215, at 11 (“[A] word’s 
meaning often does not derive from some foundational referent in the world, but, rather, is 
determined by the use to which it is properly put within a particular language-game.” 
(internal citations omitted)).  
233 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 243; STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 59, at § 3.6 (noting that in the private-language argument 
sections of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein “point[s] out that for an utterance 
to be meaningful it must be possible in principle to subject it to public standards and 
criteria of correctness”). 
234 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 243. Cf. 
CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 234 (1985) (“Men speak together, to 
each other. Language is fashioned and grows not principally in monologue, but in dialogue, 
or better, in the life of the speech community.”). 
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argument’,” Alice objected. 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a 
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—
neither more nor less.” 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make 
words mean so many different things.” 
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be 
master—that’s all.”235 
Humpty Dumpty is speaking a private language, and thus speaking 
nonsense, but the question he identifies is essentially the same one asked by 
analytic philosophers. After the linguistic turn, at least, they concluded that 
use was the master of language, not the other way around. 
In a variety of ways, the Supreme Court has indicated the same thing, 
suggesting that the First Amendment has at least partially taken its own 
linguistic turn with regard to meaning. This is a welcome development both 
descriptively and normatively, for the use meaning approach better captures 
both the actual contours of existing First Amendment coverage and the 
constitutional value of what would otherwise seem to be meaningless 
speech.  
The First Amendment’s linguistic turn manifests itself in many areas of 
doctrine, perhaps most prominently in cases that tinker with Spence’s 
conceptualist machinery. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and 
Bisexual Group of Boston,236 for example, where the Court assessed the 
constitutional salience of a Hibernian pride parade. The Justices conceded 
that it was difficult to locate a “narrow, succinctly articulable message” in 
the parade,237 but concluded that no such showing was required. A 
unanimous Court held that the parade qualified for protection, and that “if 
confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ [the First 
Amendment] would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of 
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.”238 This is effectively a rejection of the conceptual approach 
and an endorsement of the idea that meaning lies in form and use. 
Hurley’s almost-cavalier approach to meaning and the First Amendment 
has by now received extensive scholarly attention. But the distinction 
between the conceptual and use approaches animates many other cases as 
well. In Morse v. Frederick,239 the Court upheld the suspension of a high 
school student who had unfurled a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” 
                                                
235 CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, supra note 46, at 123. 
236 515 U.S. 557 (1995).  
237 Id. at 569. 
238 Id. at 569 (internal citations omitted).   
239 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
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at an off-campus school function. The Court conceded that the banner’s 
purported message “is cryptic. It is no doubt offensive to some, perhaps 
amusing to others. To still others, it probably means nothing at all,”240 but 
concluded that the student’s suspension was “consistent with the First 
Amendment” because the banner “is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal 
drug use.”241 The student himself said, quite plausibly, that “the words were 
just nonsense meant to attract television cameras.”242 In dissent, Justice 
Stevens similarly concluded that “[t]his is a nonsense message, not 
advocacy,”243 and that the school therefore had no sufficient reason to 
punish it.  
On a strictly conceptual approach, the words “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” 
are as nonsensical as Chomsky’s “colorless green ideas sleep furiously.”244 
(If a group of students displayed the latter on a banner, it might also 
reasonably be viewed as promoting—or perhaps demonstrating—illegal 
drug use.) Indeed, the student’s declaration that the banner was designed to 
be nonsense, if accepted, should have taken him outside the realm of Spence 
v. Washington, since no “intent to convey a particularized message was 
present.”245 To the conceptualist, then, the act involved only nonsense. If 
the First Amendment requires the presence of meaning,246 then there was no 
constitutional issue to begin with.  
Under a use meaning approach, by contrast, the fact that the banner’s 
words conveyed no semantic content does not preclude them from having 
meaning, which derives from use, not representation. That use, the majority 
concluded, imbued them with drug-promoting meaning, not simply 
television-attracting meaning. In other words, the use meaning approach can 
account for the existence of meaning in the banner, therefore bringing the 
case within the boundaries of the First Amendment and enabling the more 
substantive and useful debate over whether the majority identified the 
correct meaning, and whether the government had sufficient reason to 
                                                
240 Id. at 401. 
241 Id. at 403. 
242 Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2006). 
243 Morse, 551 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 435 (referring to the 
“nonsense banner”).  
244 CHOMSKY, supra note 61, at 15. See Bill Poser, “The Supreme Court Fails 
Semantics,” LANGUAGE LOG, http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/ 
004696.html (last visited June 13, 2012) (“[T]he Court has invalidly inferred a particular 
proposition. The slogan is in fact meaningless in the sense that it expresses no proposition, 
and Frederick gave a perfectly plausible explanation for the use of a meaningless slogan. 
The Court was therefore wrong in finding that the banner advocates the use of 
marijuana.”). 
245 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). 
246 See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text. 
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regulate it.247 
This is the same basic insight reflected in the First Amendment’s 
attention to context as a component of meaning. The conceptual approach is 
relatively, if not entirely, acontextual. Whether a word “really” corresponds 
to an underlying concept is generally not dependent on the context in which 
that word is deployed. But First Amendment doctrine itself is deeply 
attuned to the fact that context can create or change meaning.248 Even 
Spence recognized that “context may give meaning to the symbol.”249 The 
Court there noted that hanging a flag upside down with peace symbols 
attached to it related to a “contemporaneous issue of intense public 
concern,”250 and that observers were likely to recognize Spence’s point “at 
the time that he made it,”251 even though in a different context it “might be 
interpreted as nothing more than bizarre behavior.”252 A similar principle 
seems to be on display (so to speak) in the Court’s nude dancing cases, 
where the Justices have taken pains to distinguish between “bacchanalian 
revelries” in barrooms and “a performance by a scantily clad ballet troupe in 
a theater.”253  
                                                
247 The meaning (or lack thereof) of the banner would of course be relevant to that 
inquiry. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that nonsense should be free from 
government regulation precisely because it lacks meaning. Chevigny, supra note 85, at 164 
(arguing that under the early Wittgenstein’s view of ethics as nonsense, the “most 
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meaningless. The government could have no reason to restrain debates that continue 
endlessly without hope of a fruitful result”); see also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 182 
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Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
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specific communicative act . . . .”). 
249 418 U.S. at 410. 
250 Id. That context included “the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State 
University, events which occurred a few days prior to his arrest.” Id. at 408. 
251 Id. 
252 Id.  
253 California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972); see also Joshua Waldman, Symbolic 
Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1873 (1997) (“The Supreme Court’s 
nude-dancing cases establish the proposition that constitutional significance may be 
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Further hints of the use meaning approach can be found in the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that First Amendment coverage extends to practices that 
form a “significant medium for the communication of ideas,”254 even if the 
specific communication at issue does not successfully convey a 
particularized message.255 Robert Post has provided the strongest normative 
justification for this approach, arguing that “First Amendment coverage 
presumptively extends to media for the communication of ideas, like 
newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or cinema, which are the primary 
vehicles for the circulation of the texts that define and sustain the public 
sphere.”256 It follows that, “in the absence of strong countervailing reasons, 
whatever is said within such media is covered by the First Amendment.”257 
On this approach, “Jabberwocky” is covered by the First Amendment not 
because its words represent concepts, but because it is recognizable as a 
poem.  
The same basic intuition might be animating the intuitively appealing 
but deeply problematic effort to draw a line between “pure speech” and 
expressive conduct. The Supreme Court has suggested that pure speech—
apparently conceived as the spoken or written word, with no accompanying 
nonverbal action258—should receive complete constitutional coverage,259 
apparently without any further inquiry into its meaningfulness. Expresive 
conduct, by contrast, is covered only when it is sufficiently imbued with 
“communicative elements” as to bring it within the boundaries of the 
Amendment.260 In other words, it must, at least according to some accounts, 
convey ideas or meaning.261 The pure speech/expressive conduct dichotomy 
is deeply problematic262 and ultimately unworkable. But the effort itself 
                                                                                                                       
ascribed to the context in which the dancing takes place.”). 
254 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
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258 Carney R. Shegerian, A Sign of the Times: The United States Supreme Court 
Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored Requirement for Time, Place, and Manner 
Restrictions, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453, 471 (1992) (“Pure speech has been generally 
defined as communicative expression in a pure state without physical activity.”); Susan J. 
Rice, Note, The Search for Valid Governmental Regulations: A Review of the Judicial 
Response to Municipal Policies Regarding First Amendment Activities, 63 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 561, 563 (1988). 
259 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
260 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
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demonstrates that meaning may lie in form and use, rather than in 
representation.263 
 
C.   Making the Most of the First Amendment’s Linguistic Turn 
 
Endorsing use meaning as an alternative to the conceptual meaning is 
relatively easy; implementing it is not. It should by now be apparent that the 
boundaries of the First Amendment cannot be explained on the basis of the 
relationship between language and extra-linguistic facts, as the conceptual 
meaning approach would suggest. But to say that those boundaries do or 
should depend instead on “language games” raises a new, albeit more 
useful, set of questions. This final section explores a few of them. 
First, the arguments presented above might suggest that basing the 
boundaries of the First Amendment on use meaning rather than conceptual 
meaning would still be under-inclusive with respect to various First 
Amendment values. After all, Section I.B argued that nonsense should be 
constitutionally protected in part because it can and does further the central 
values of the First Amendment. Most of the examples discussed there were 
conceptual nonsense—language or conduct lacking a connection to extra-
linguistic facts. But it is not hard to imagine how “use nonsense”—private 
language—could also further basic First Amendment values like 
autonomy.264 And for many of the same reasons laid out in Section I.B.1, 
use nonsense might also further the marketplace of ideas. The use meaning 
approach might, for example, deny coverage to incidents of lost and found 
meaning,265 at least if the action giving rise to the meaning were not itself 
recognizable as a form of speech. This could explain why many prominent 
First Amendment scholars have rejected a generalist account of the 
constitutional value of form,266 focusing instead on the ideas they 
                                                                                                                       
Amendment is about speech and the press—about words.”). 
263 Post, Recuperating, supra note 34, at 1257 (“The very concept of a medium 
presupposes that constitutionally protected expression does not inhere in abstract and 
disembodied acts of communication of the kind envisioned by Spence, but is instead 
always conveyed through social and material forms of interaction.”). 
264 Rosen, supra note 54 (“[W]e are hemmed in, even trapped, by common usage. . . . 
[T]he conventions of language and of society are in principle arbitrary—that is, imposed by 
will. They prevent the natural development of the individual.”). 
265 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. 
266 See Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 34 n. 22 (“For an exploration of the 
thesis that the first amendment protects ideas and not a particular form of expression, see 
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and 
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189 (1970).”); Louis Henkin, On Drawing Lines, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 63, 79–80 (1968) (“The meaningful constitutional distinction is not between 
speech and conduct, but between conduct that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of 
conduct. If it is intended as expression, if in fact it communicates, especially if it becomes a 
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capture.267  
This is a difficult and deceptively complex objection, as is the best 
answer to it: that private language, whatever relationships it might have 
with the First Amendment’s values, simply is not speech. In other words, 
the furtherance of autonomy, ideas, or democracy is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a particular act or utterance to qualify as “speech” 
for constitutional purposes. Consider Jed Rubenfeld’s example of a person 
who speeds to express disapproval of speed limits,268 or Tushnet’s example 
of ticket scalping.269 These activities undoubtedly advance the autonomy 
interests of those engaged in them, and perhaps even communicate ideas. 
But so do innumerable other activities, from terrorist attacks to rape. 
Prohibition of those activities is perfectly constitutional under the First 
Amendment not because the government interest in doing so is sufficiently 
strong, but because they are not thought to implicate the First Amendment 
at all. To borrow Schauer’s terminology, they are uncovered, not merely 
unprotected.270 
The question of what constitutes “speech” is, in turn, an old one for First 
Amendment theory and doctrine, and the difficulty of articulating anything 
like a precise definition is familiar. This Article has focused on one possible 
component of speech—meaning—not the concept of speech as a whole. 
The two inquiries might be distinct; perhaps meaning must be accompanied 
by a volitional act or utterance to constitute speech. To the degree that the 
discussion here provides lessons for the quest to define speech itself, it is 
that the answers probably lie in social practices rather than in formal 
logic.271 In the end, as Frederick Schauer explains, “the very idea of free 
speech is a crude implement, to the core, protecting acts that its background 
justifications would not protect, and failing to protect acts that its 
background justifications would protect.”272  
But the crudeness of the implement raises another and perhaps equally 
                                                                                                                       
common comprehensible form of expression, it is ‘speech.’”). 
267 Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 34 (“It is the ideas expressed, and not 
just a particular form of expression, that must be the protected if the underlying first 
amendment values are to be realized.”). 
268 Rubenfeld, supra note 35, at 772 (“But suppose A says that his conduct was 
expressive. Suppose he says that driving fast is how he  ‘expresses himself.’ Or that he was 
‘expressing disagreement’ with the federally mandated speed limit. Or that his speeding 
was ‘performance  art.’”). . 
269 But see Tushnet, supra note 9, at 194 (criticizing the argument that “a reasonably 
widespread imputation of roughly the same meaning” can indicate First Amendment 
coverage). 
270 See Schauer, Categories, supra note 6, at 270-7. 
271 This is precisely the quest in which Robert Post has long been engaged. See e.g., 
Post, Recuperating, supra note 34, at 1250. 
272 Schauer, Second-Best, supra note 88, at 13. 
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foundational challenge for the use meaning approach: negotiating the 
tension between the First Amendment’s desire for clear boundaries and 
language games’ resistance to them. As to the former, the importance of 
clarity in First Amendment doctrine is recognized as an independent value 
in its own right.273 Language games, however, are a poor guide for 
establishing clear boundaries. Both in their definition and in their behavior, 
language games “lack purity.”274 Post, whose First Amendment theory 
depends on identifying those boundaries, concludes that although we do not 
“have a very clear or hard-edged account” of the boundaries of public 
discourse, “it is anthropologically apparent that they do exist and are 
reflected in constitutional doctrine.”275 Ordinary language philosophers, too, 
embrace this as not merely a necessary drawback, but a positive feature of 
their approach. As Toril Moi explains, “[o]ften the blurred concept is 
exactly what we want . . . . In many cases . . ., it is useless to spend time and 
energy trying to produce a sharp concept.”276 
The problem is not simply that language games have fuzzy boundaries, 
but that it is difficult to know at what level of generality they should be 
defined. After all, “use” can refer to an individual speech act or to a broader 
category of speech acts bearing a family resemblance;277 language games 
can involve two people, a group, or an entire community. Ordinary 
language philosophy typically takes the former route, focusing on the 
meaning of particular speech acts. The inevitable result is a kind of case-
by-case analysis that requires careful consideration of individual speech 
acts.  
But whatever its merits as a philosophical approach to language, the 
case-by-case approach does not necessarily make for good First 
Amendment doctrine. Case-by-case ex post analysis is ill-suited to provide 
the kind of articulable ex ante rules that law—and especially First 
Amendment doctrine—is generally thought to require.278 First Amendment 
                                                
273 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (holding a statute void for 
vagueness under a First Amendment analysis because of its chilling effect on protected 
speech); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding federal injunction against 
state court prosecutions under vague state statutes, on the basis of “chilling” effect). 
274 Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, supra note 37, at 1802. STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 59, at § 3.4 (noting that Wittgenstein “never explicitly defines” 
the concept of language-game); Chevigny, supra note 85, at 167 (“Wittgenstein’s 
‘language-game’ concept has been criticized for a lack of precision.”). 
275 Post, Reply, supra note 15, at 622-23. 
276 Moi, supra note 225, at 813–14. 
277 See WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 3.311 (“An expression 
presupposes the forms of all propositions in which it can occur. It is the common 
characteristic mark of a class of propositions.”).  
278 See, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (“First, because we 
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws 
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language games must be defined with sufficient breadth that individuals can 
tailor their conduct accordingly. A use meaning approach to the 
Amendment’s boundaries must therefore focus to some degree on form and 
use, rather than act and use.  
The cost of that breadth, however, is inaccuracy. The more broadly a 
First Amendment language game is defined, the less likely it is to capture 
the values that justify its protection, and the more likely it is to be 
overinclusive with regard to speech. But that is a cost that the First 
Amendment encourages us to pay.279 Defining speech at the level of form 
rather than that of individual speech acts may be imperfect, but it does help 
check the government’s power to regulate speech by defining its 
boundaries. 
The malleability of the language game approach also suggests ways to 
account for new social practices and language games—video games, for 
example.280 Defining these as “speech” based on the ideas they convey 
seems unsatisfying, to say the least. The answer seems to lie instead instead 
with the fact that over time they have simply become recognized as such. 
Admittedly, the power to make that determination is itself a form of speech 
regulation.281 But such line-drawing is inevitably a part of First Amendment 
doctrine. Better that the lines be drawn on the basis of such social practices 
than on the basis of supposed relationships between words and concepts. 
There are no straightforward and simple solutions to these problems.282 
                                                                                                                       
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. . . . [W]here a vague statute ‘abut(s) upon 
sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise of 
(those) freedoms.’”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 370 (1983) (White, J., 
concurring) (“The Court has held that in such circumstances ‘more precision in drafting 
may be required because of the vagueness doctrine in the case of regulation of expression;’ 
a ‘greater degree of specificity’ is demanded than in other contexts.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
279 Schauer, Second Best, supra note 88, at 22 (“[T]he idea of free speech, as 
contrasted with the justifications it is thought to serve, is itself an exercise in distrust, in 
suboptimality, and in the recognition of the frequent virtues of second-best solutions.”). 
280 Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (striking down, on First 
Amendment grounds, restrictions on sales of violent video games to minors); see also 
United States v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010) (striking down restrictions on depictions of 
animal cruelty). 
281 Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s 
Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1303, 1343 (2009) (emphasis added) (“Whether through its 
political or its judicial branches, governmental definition of the scope of public discourse is 
itself a regulation of public discourse[.]”). 
282 Post, Public Discourse, supra note 248, at 683 (“In the end . . . there can be no final 
account of the boundaries of the domain of public discourse.”). 
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First Amendment doctrine has proven slithy283 enough to cover the 
Jabberwocky and other nonsensical speech, but perhaps the Justices will see 
fit to gimble284 exceptions for other kinds of nonsense, leaving even non-
artists mimsy.285 First Amendment doctrine and the language games on 
which it is based are messy and ongoing projects—an experiment, “as all 
life is an experiment.”286 The Amendment’s “linguistic turn” would yield no 
more clear answers than the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy. But it 
would, at the very least, better capture what we mean by meaning, and why 
we think it matters for the First Amendment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Since Ludwig Wittgenstein has served as a guide and occasional 
stalking horse throughout this Article, it seems appropriate to conclude 
where the Tractatus does. The seventh and final section famously reads, in 
full: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”287 If the 
boundaries of the First Amendment depend on the presence of conceptual 
meaning, then Congress could codify Wittgenstein’s admonition without 
violating the constitution, because saying what cannot be said is, by 
definition, nonsense. This Article has argued that this cannot be the case, 
and that the meaning of speech lies not in its connection to extra-linguistic 
facts, but in its use. This road is more bumpy, but its imperfection offers 
better footing than the smooth alternatives. “Back to the rough ground!”288  
 
* * * 
                                                
283 THE ANNOTATED ALICE: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION (Martin Gardner, ed. 1999) 
(defining “slithy” as “a combination of ‘slimy’ and ‘lithe’; smooth and active”). 
284 Id. (defining “gimble” as “to bore holes”). 
285 Id. (defining “mimsy” as “miserable or unhappy, contemptible”). 
286 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
287 WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 7. It is difficult not to imagine this as 
Wittgenstein’s version of resting on the seventh day. See Exodus 20:11 (King James) (“[I]n 
six days the LORD made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the 
seventh day: wherefore the LORD blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it.”). 
288 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 107 (“We have 
got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are 
ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need 
friction. Back to the rough ground!”). 
 
